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This thesis seeks to answer how leadership can unify the Norwegian Special Operation 
Forces and improve its organizational efficiency. From January 1, 2014, the two 
Norwegian special operations commands, Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK) and 
Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK), were joined in one service-like combatant command: 
Forsvarets Spesialstyrker (FS). 
FSK and MJK each have a long history, and their legacy and culture “sit in their 
hearts.” The two units are, in many ways, alike, but their differences have been 
highlighted when it comes to the future of the Norwegian Special Operation Forces. 
This thesis uses relevant literature, the authors’ personal experiences, and 
statistical analysis of precollected survey data to answer the research question. It offers an 
overview of the Norwegian Special Operation Forces’ history, maps the current 
organizational culture, and suggests a leadership approach to unify the two units and the 
newly established joint command staff in order to improve organizational efficiency.  
The aim is to provide recommendations to assist with the process of forging a 
highly capable Norwegian Special Operation Forces for the 21st century. 
 v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. FORGING NORWEGIAN SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES .............................1 
A. IDENTIFYING THE CHALLENGE ............................................................1 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE FOR THIS RESEARCH ......................................2 
C. DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................2 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION ...............................................................................4 
E. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................4 
1. Literature Review ................................................................................4 
2. Analysis of Precollected Survey Data .................................................4 
II. HISTORY OF NORWEGIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES.....................7 
A. WORLD WAR II .............................................................................................7 
1. Kompani Linge .....................................................................................8 
2. Shetlandsgjengen..................................................................................9 
B. FORSVARETS SPESIALKOMMANDO ...................................................10 
C. MARINEJEGERKOMMANDOEN ............................................................12 
D. ATTEMPTED MERGERS ...........................................................................15 
E. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FORSVARETS SPESIALSTYRKER 
JANUARY 1, 2014 .........................................................................................17 
III. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ...........................................................................21 
A. THE CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ...........................22 
1. Organizational Culture Defined .......................................................22 
2. Functional, Dysfunctional, Weak, and Strong Organizational 
Culture ................................................................................................25 
3. The Three Levels of Culture .............................................................27 
B. FORSVARETS SPESIALRTYRKER’S CULTURE .................................31 
1. Organizational Culture and Performance .......................................31 
2. Forsvarets Spesialstyrker ..................................................................35 
a. Mission ....................................................................................37 
b. Consistency ..............................................................................38 
c. Involvement .............................................................................39 
d. Adaptability..............................................................................40 
C. WHEN CULTURES MEET .........................................................................43 
1. The Multi-Cultural Challenge ..........................................................43 
a. Are FSK and MJK Compatible? .............................................44 
b. Merger Strategies ....................................................................51 
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF LEADERSHIP ...............................................................55 
A. WHY LEADERSHIP IS IMPORTANT ......................................................56 
1. Findings ...............................................................................................57 
B. HOW LEADERSHIP SHOULD BE EXECUTED .....................................59 
1. Mission Command .............................................................................60 
a. Findings ...................................................................................60 
2. Soft Leadership ..................................................................................62 
 vii 
3. Team Orientation ...............................................................................63 
a. Findings ...................................................................................64 
C. WHICH LEADERSHIP TOOLS SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED .............65 
1. Communication ..................................................................................66 
a. Findings ...................................................................................68 
2. Commitment .......................................................................................71 
a. Findings ...................................................................................73 
3. Trust ....................................................................................................74 
a. Findings ...................................................................................76 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STUDIES .............................................................77 
APPENDIX A: EXCEPT OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ...........................................89 
APPENDIX B: SELECTED REGRESSION ANALYSIS TABLES ................................95 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................101 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. The Norwegian Army in 2009 .........................................................................12 
Figure 2. MJK and the Royal Norwegian Navy after January 1, 2012 ...........................14 
Figure 3. Organizational Chart, FS .................................................................................20 
Figure 4. Organizational culture in FS ............................................................................24 
Figure 5. Employee background in FS ............................................................................25 
Figure 6. Number of years in FSK / MJK .......................................................................26 
Figure 7. The three levels of culture ................................................................................28 
Figure 8. Cultural categories FSK and MJK ...................................................................29 
Figure 9. The Denison Model..........................................................................................31 
Figure 10. Circumplex report Forsvarets Spesialstyrker ...................................................35 
Figure 11. The indexes of the Mission trait ranked ...........................................................37 
Figure 12. The indexes of the Consistency trait ranked ....................................................39 
Figure 13. The indexes of the Involvement trait ranked ...................................................39 
Figure 14. The indexes of the Adaptability trait ranked....................................................41 
Figure 15. FS compared to NLMARSOF .........................................................................42 
Figure 16. MJK vs. FSK viewed by both FSK and MJK ..................................................45 
Figure 17. Cooperation between FSK and MJK ...............................................................46 
Figure 18. Most important requirements ...........................................................................47 
Figure 19. Type of missions ..............................................................................................48 
Figure 20. Division of labor – Domain .............................................................................48 
Figure 21. Interchangeability between FSK and MJK ......................................................49 
Figure 22. Is FS optimally organized? ..............................................................................50 
Figure 23. Future – One unit? ...........................................................................................51 
Figure 24. Leaders as role models and distinctive leadership in FS .................................57 
Figure 25. Leaders setting and articulating goals/objectives in FS ...................................58 
Figure 26. Leaders and vision in FS ..................................................................................58 
Figure 27. Measured Mission Command in FS .................................................................61 
Figure 28. Measured Team Orientation in FS ...................................................................64 
Figure 29. Measured Communication in FS .....................................................................68 
Figure 30. Measured Commitment in FS ..........................................................................73 
Figure 31. Measured Trust in FS .......................................................................................76 
Figure 32. The Denison Model..........................................................................................80 
Figure 33. Circumplex report Forsvarets Spesialstyrker ...................................................81 
 
 ix 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Mean score Denison Organizational Culture Survey.......................................36 
Table 2. Merger strategies ..............................................................................................52 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics: Consistency testing and scoring of compiled 
questions regarding CCT .................................................................................66 
Table 4. Communication in FS, shown with two demographics in respectively FSK 
and MJK, in reference to Figure above ............................................................69 
Table 5. Commitment in FS, shown with two demographics in respectively FSK 
and MJK, in reference to Figure above ............................................................73 
Table 6. Trust in FS, shown with two demographics in FSK and MJK respectively, 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CCT Communication, Commitment, Trust 
CHOD Chief of Defence 
DIF Driftsenhet i Forsvaret 
There is no applicable translation for this term in English. DIF is 
an independent section subordinate to, and direct reporting lines to, 
the Chief of Defence. It is a service-like construction. 
DOCS Denison Organizational Culture Survey 
FFI Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt 
The English translation is [Norwegian] Defence Research 
Establishment 
FS Forsvarets Spesialstyrker 
The English translation is [Norwegian] Armed Forces’ Special 
Forces. It is also referred to as Norwegian Special Operation 
Forces (NORSOF). The term/abbreviation FS will be used 
exclusively in this thesis to depict the overarching name for 
FSK+MJK, including the joint supervision staff:  FSST.     
FSK Forsvarets Spesialkommando 
The English translation is [Norwegian] Armed Forces’ Special 
Command. The term/abbreviation FSK will be used exclusively in 
this thesis referring to FSK/HJK. The unit’s name is FSK and it 
has a coordination role towards the Army.  
FSST Forsvarets Spesialstyrker/Stab 
The English translation is [Norwegian] Armed Forces’ Special 
Forces/Staff. ) It is also referred to as Norwegian Special 
Operation Command (NORSOCOM). The term/abbreviation FSST 
will be used exclusively in this thesis to depict the joint 
supervision staff overarching FSK+MJK. 
HJK Hærens Jegerkommando 
The English translation is [Norwegian] Army Special Operation 
Command (NORARSOC). 
MJK Marinejegerkommandoen 
The English translation is [Norwegian] Navy Special Operation 
Command (NORNAVSOC). MJK has a coordination role towards 
the Navy. 
MoD The Norwegian Ministry of Defence. 
 xiii 
MoJ The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security. 
NAF Norwegian Armed Forces 
NATO The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
NORSOF Norwegian Special Operations Forces 
SIS Secret Intelligence Service 
SOA  Spesialoperasjonsavdelingen 
The English translation is Special Operation Division. This 
division was embedded in The Defence Staff.   
SOE Special Operations Executive 
SOF Special Operations Forces 
STS Special Training Schools  
 xiv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to express our gratitude to our adviser Anna Simons for the useful 
comments, remarks, and engagement through the learning process of this master’s thesis. 
She has shown a genuine interest in the Norwegian Special Operation Forces in general, 
and specifically the Norwegian students here at Naval Postgraduate School. Our research 
topic was supported immediately and her insight and experience really guided us steadily 
toward graduation. 
Furthermore, we would like to thank our second reader, Frank B. Steder, and his 
affiliated establishment. From his remote location at the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (FFI) in Kjeller, Norway, he has guided and supported our project in an 
outstanding manner. Frank provided us with access to declassified precollected survey 
data that was crucial for our research and analysis. In this regard, we will also, indirectly, 
give our thanks to all the respondents of the survey that was conducted by FFI. The 
opportunity to utilize this precollected survey data was very helpful to our project. All the 
respondents from FS (FSK, MJK, FSST) willingly shared their precious time, and we 
appreciate their response and commitment to the survey. Frank’s eagerness to support the 
practical work of the statistical analysis has been supremely valuable.  
We will also thank our third reader, Brian Greenshields, who always had an open 
door and made time available for us, whether our visit was regarding the project or not. 
Finally, we would like to thank the Naval Postgraduate School for providing us 
with an academic framework to see this project through. We would also like to thank the 
global special operations community of which we are proudly a part. At the Naval 
Postgraduate School, we have been lucky to meet new SOF friends from all over the 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK   
 xvi 
I. FORGING NORWEGIAN SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES 
From January 1, 2014, the two Norwegian special operations commands, 
Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK) and Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK), were joined 
under one combatant command, Forsvarets Spesialstyrker (FS). The staff of FS is one of 
the smallest in the Norwegian Armed Forces, numbering only 37 positions, and with a 
two-star Flag Officer commanding it. Over the past year, the process of establishing FS 
has been messy and the outcome is not what was initially intended by the Chief of 
Defence (CHOD). We believe it is fair to say that the relationship between FSK and MJK 
is at its lowest or worst level today. This claim is derived from the perception of public 
discourse over the past two years. As members of the Norwegian Special Operation 
Forces, we also have some first-hand experience with the relationship, or lack of a 
relationship, between FSK and MJK. For our analysis we will only use unclassified 
information and reliable written sources. Again, based on the public discourse provided 
we believe that the relationship between FSK and MJK has not been healthy. Some of the 
reasons why will be examined in this thesis. Regardless of the dispute, FS now exists and 
the importance of forging a cohesive FS by unifying the units is crucial.  
A. IDENTIFYING THE CHALLENGE 
MJK and FSK are not technically merged, but they have both been taken out of 
their respective Services and put administratively under FS; FS is an independent, 
Service-like unit in the Norwegian Armed Forces, along with 21 others (e.g., Navy, 
Army, Air Force, Home Guard, Intelligence, Defence Staff, and Joint Headquarters). The 
ranking officers for the respective Services—Navy, Army, Home Guard, Cyber, and Air 
Force—are likewise two star Flag Officers. MJK and FSK each have a long history and a 
legacy and culture that “sit in their hearts.” The authors’ assumption is that the two units 
are, in many ways, alike, but differences have been highlighted and dominating when it 
comes to the future for Norwegian Special Operation Forces. Differences, and 
similarities, can be found in the domains of culture, technology, organization, policies 
and procedures. Presuming that the FS structure will stay as it is for the near future, the 
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most identifiable challenge, as we see it, will be to unify the two tactical units led by 
Forsvarets Spesialstyrker Stab (FSST) sufficiently to achieve organizational efficiencies. 
The challenge this in turn presents is how to exercise leadership at “all leadership levels” 
so as to gain the greatest effects with the minimum of waste. 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE FOR THIS RESEARCH 
The purpose of this thesis is to assist FS with its forging process. Furthermore, the 
purpose is to show the importance of leadership when it comes to unification and the 
improvement of organizational efficiencies. We believe this thesis will benefit the newly 
established FS. In addition, we believe that both FSK and MJK, respectively, can utilize 
the findings independently to contribute to the forging process.   
The thesis specifically concentrates on aspects of leadership needed during 
forging/merging processes, and draws on literature as well as operators’ experience. We 
examine FSK’s and MJK’s history, legacy, and existing culture, utilizing surveys 
conducted prior to our research. We regard leadership (as we will define it) as a 
fundamental foundation, and even as a prerequisite, for discussing other potential or 
future challenges. We will not discuss the strategic utility of Norwegian Special 
Operation Forces, or analyze the organizational structure of FS, FSK, or MJK. 
C. DEFINITIONS 
Leadership: There is an immense literature on leadership, and many potential 
definitions of leadership to choose from. For the purpose of this thesis we define 
leadership as: Influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation in 
order to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. 
This definition captures the essence of what we believe is important in regard to 





Organizational Culture: We believe that there are better and worse cultures, that 
different cultures can be stronger or weaker, and that the “right” kind of culture will have 
an impact on how efficient an organization is. By “organizational culture” we lean toward 
a definition which highlights the elements of external adaption and internal integration, 
validation, and a continuous learning organization. Here is the definition we are going to 
use in this document:  
A pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to 
new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems.1 
Forging, Unifying, and Merging: The title of this thesis is Forging Norwegian 
Special Operation Forces. By “forging” we refer to the process of establishing FS, and 
although there may be challenges, measures must be made to ensure that the process is 
moving forward. In addition, we also envision this process to be a steady one. This means 
that it should be anticipated that the forging process will take time. 
By “unifying” we simply mean that the newly established Command, FS, together 
with the two organic tactical units, FSK and MJK, have a common goal and comprise a 
coherent whole. Coherence is here implied to be an exclusively positive trait, not 
impeded by cognitive biases such as groupthink.   
By “merger” we mean the act or process of combining two or more units into one. 
Implicit in this is the notion that the members do not treat either themselves or those of 
the other unit as dominant. Although the two tactical units in FS have not merged into 
one unit, we envision the whole process of establishing FS as invoking a merger. The two 
units have been taken from their respective Services and put together under one newly 
established command, FS. 
 
 
1 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 4th ed. (San Francisco: Jossey – Bass, 
2010), 40. 
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Organizational Efficiency: There are several definitions for “organizational 
efficiency.” Most of them tend to be somewhat vague, and most of them are aimed 
toward return on investment (ROI). Money, per se, is not the primary concern for this 
thesis, but efficiency implies that there can be a non-economic return on investment. For 
the purpose of this thesis, organizational efficiency is regarded as: The capacity of an 
organization to meet or exceed goals with a minimum expenditure of energy, time, 
money, personnel, materiel, etc. Meanwhile, an efficient organization overhauls its 
procedures and policies to create a satisfying working environment. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can NORSOF be unified in order to improve its organizational efficiency? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
1. Literature Review 
The empirical and conceptual literature we draw on represents a mix between 
Norwegian and international sources. We find it important to anchor the thesis in 
Norwegian sources in order to create legitimacy and a connection to governing 
documents/policies and practice.  
2. Analysis of Precollected Survey Data 
We have utilized precollected data from a survey conducted by the Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment (Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt, FFI). The FFI survey 
was designed to “map” the cultures in FSK, MJK, FSST, and in FS as a whole. Most of 
what we use consists of frequency analysis of specific questions; in some cases a more 
deliberate analysis was undertaken and this will be elaborated on. In addition to using this 
precollected data, we will “compare” the results against a benchmark test conducted by 
Dennison Consulting. In addition, we will also make comparisons to benchmark tests 
done for NLMARSOF, available in a Naval Postgraduate School thesis from 2012.2  
2 Andy Kraag, “Forging Netherlands Maritime Special Operations Forces” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2012). 
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A closer examination of the precollected data reveals a possible bias in the strata 
surveyed. To avoid over- or under-representation by any specific demographic, we 
checked for significance through a sensitivity analysis comparing adjusted to unadjusted 
strata. The discrepancies were not large, but too statistically significant to ignore. A 
stratified randomization was then conducted. A random sample from each stratum was 
taken in a number proportional to the stratum's size when compared to the population. 
These subsets of the strata were then pooled to form a random sample. 
We set the confidence level at 95%, which gives us a confidence interval of 5.5. 
This means that if 47% percent of the sample picks an answer, you can be 95% sure that 
if you had asked the question of the entire relevant population between 41.5% (47-5.5) 
and 52.5% (47+5.5) would have picked that answer.  
In general, the frequency analyses will reflect only three alternatives for answers: 
“Agree, Neutral, and Disagree.” Originally there were five alternatives (Strongly Agree, 
Agree, Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree), but these were compiled into three to 
yield more meaningful visual depictions in figures/diagrams. Further statistical 
considerations were factored in specific cases; these will be noted and explained on a 
case by case basis. 
When it comes to possible biases doing the analysis and writing of this thesis we 
are aware that: 
• As described in the history chapter (II, D) there have been previous 
attempts to merge FSK and MJK. The year 2013 was especially notable 
due to major differences of opinion when it came to the future 
organization of the Norwegian Special Operation Forces. The survey 
results might be influenced by this in the way that the respondents 
answered; recent events might have colored their responses. It might be 
fair to suggest that this was more true for MJK than FSK due to the fact 
that MJK was on the verge of being assimilated into FSK.    
• The questionnaire was quite extensive. We only used excerpts of the 
survey that was compiled and distributed by FFI. The survey was not 
solely designed to answer the question posed by this thesis. Due to the 
extensive nature of the questionnaire, some respondents might have 
browsed through the questions and spent too short a time on their 
responses. 
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• The questions in the survey touch on many topics and not all of the 
respondents might have had sufficient “knowledge” to answer all of the 
questions. This could have led to a relatively high number of neutral 
responses and even some of the questions might have been answered on 
“false grounds.” 
• The questionnaire was distributed to FS as a whole. The different units 
might have “favored” their own unit, hence not reflecting entirely 
objective or complete truthfully. 
• Both authors of this thesis are affiliated with MJK and have their daily 
duty there. We have tried to be objective and have sought to examine the 
findings through an FS lens. 
• Not all possible aspects that can be derived from the questionnaire have 
been examined. The findings presented were selected based on our 
literature review and benchmark testing, as well as at our discretion.      
• Findings based on statistics will always be generalized findings. We have 
avoided going too deep into the strata to avoid small samples that cannot 
be considered representative of the whole population. We have also done 
this to keep the thesis unclassified and reduce the risk of unveiling 
Personal Identifiable Information (PII).  
• FS is a fairly new organization. It had only been ‘live’ for three months 
when the survey was distributed. It would be fair to say that respondents 
might have found it difficult to answer cultural questions regarding FS. 
Some of the respondents’ answers might well be aimed at their respective 
tactical unit, even if they were supposed to be aimed at FS as a whole. In 
this regard, it might be possible that some respondents “did not 
understand” a question the way it was intended.     
 6 
II. HISTORY OF NORWEGIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES 
We study the past to understand the present; we understand the present to 
guide the future.3 
 
It is not possible to research the organizational culture of Forsvarets 
Spesialstyrker (FS) without looking at its history. With the exception of the WWII 
period, references to the history of the Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) 
were sparse until Tor Jørgen Melien published the book Våre Hemmelige Soldater [Our 
Secret Soldiers] in 2012.4 Melien, a naval officer and historian, was given full access by 
the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF) and the two Norwegian SOF units during the course 
of research for his book. Both units were eager to have their history written down. The 
result is a detailed book about NORSOF’s history from 1940 to 2012, and we will use 
this as the primary source for this part of the thesis. In addition to Melien’s book, we also 
use Fritjof Sælen’s classic book about the Shetland gang, and two Masters theses from 
the Naval Postgraduate School and the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College 
to describe NORSOF’s history. 
A. WORLD WAR II  
Many nations, including Norway, saw the birth of their modern Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) during World War II. Norway established two military groups 
in Great Britain in the autumn of 1940 to conduct special operations against the German 
occupation of Norway.5 The two groups, both under the command of the British Special 
 3 William Lund. http://www.trschools.k12.wi.us/faculty/JPERKINS/Why%20do% 
20we%20learn%20history.pdf, accessed January 2014. 
4 Tor Jørgen Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater (Oslo: Spartacus, 2012). 
 5 Norway established other units with a capability to conduct special operations during the war, most 
notably the Norwegian Independent Parachute Company and No 5 Troop 10 Interallied Commando, 
however Kompani Linge and Shetlandsgjengen are the most famous, for more on the other units see Tor 
Jørgen Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, [Our Secret Soldiers] Oslo: Spartacus, 2012, 34– 38.  
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Operations Executive (SOE), came to be known as Kompani Linge and 
Shetlandsgjengen.6 
1. Kompani Linge 
The newly established SOE’s main purpose was “to promote sabotage and 
subversion in enemy occupied territory and to establish a nucleus of trained men tasked 
with assisting indigenous resistance groups.”7 SOE wanted, therefore to recruit 
Norwegian personnel for operations in Norway, and after a thorough screening 
Lieutenant Martin Linge was selected to be in charge of the recruitment and 
administration of the Norwegians in the SOE.8 The first men Linge recruited joined 
SOE’s selection course in the autumn of 1940 in London. After completing the course 
they then attended several different Special Training Schools (STS) throughout Great 
Britain to learn all the different skills needed for inserting, conducting, and extracting 
themselves from special operations in Norway. By June 1941 the unit had established its 
own STS in its own camps near Aviemore in the Scottish Highlands.9 
The official name of the unit was Norwegian Independent Company No. 1 (NOR. 
I. C. No. 1). Members of the unit referred to it as “Norisen” and the name Kompani Linge 
was given to it when the founding father, Martin Linge, lost his life in a commando raid 
near Måløy, Norway on December 27, 1941.10 
In the first part of the war the company was mainly used for commando raids on 
the Norwegian coast. But from 1942 to the end of the war the company conducted 
numerous sabotage operations as part of the economic warfare waged against the German 
6 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 27. 
7 “Records of Special Operations Executive,” The National Archives, 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/DisplayCatalogueDetails.asp?CATID=153&CATLN=1&Ful
lDetails=True (accessed January 26, 2014). 
8 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 30. 
9 Ibid., 44. 
10 Ibid., 30. 
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occupiers. The most famous operation was Operation “Gunnerside” in 1943, which 
targeted the heavy water plant at Rjukan, crucial for Germany’s nuclear program.11    
2. Shetlandsgjengen 
In the year before Germany invaded Norway the British intelligence service at 
that time, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), had already planned for Norwegians to 
establish themselves on the Shetland Islands to conduct secret transports to Norway with 
the use of fishing vessels.12 In December 1940 the transport of agents, refugees, supplies, 
and other vital materials began as small Norwegian fishing cutters moved to and from the 
enemy-occupied territory.13 
The men who conducted these crossings were Norwegian fishermen and sailors 
recruited by the British. They went through selection and training at various STS sites 
before joining the unit that, at the start of the war, was officially named the “Norwegian 
Naval Independent Unit.”14 Although the official name later changed to the “Royal 
Norwegian Naval Special Unit,” the men themselves and the people around them referred 
to it as Shetlandsgjengen—the Shetland gang. 
During the war the unit conducted a total of 198 missions, fighting a desperate 
and lonely game of death with German patrol boats, aircraft, troops, mines, and the 
unending fury of the Northern Sea. It was dangerous duty; almost half of the men who 
joined were either lost at sea or killed in action.15  
Immediately after Germany’s defeat Norway decided to disband the special units 
it had created. The Norwegian government’s priority at this time was to rebuild Norway’s 
regular defense. The Norwegian Army and the Royal Norwegian Navy disbanded 
Kompani Linge and Shetlandsgjengen in the autumn of 1945.16 
11 Tom Robertsen,”Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006) 30. 
12 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 30. 
13 Fritjof Sælen, Sjetlands-Larsen (Bergen: J. W. Eides Forlag, 1955), 14. 
14 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 49. 
15 Sælen, Sjetlands-Larsen. 
16 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 107. 
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B. FORSVARETS SPESIALKOMMANDO 
Only a year-and-a-half after the liberation of Norway, the Norwegian army started 
to make plans for again establishing a special unit. Attempts by high-ranking officers and 
politicians were made during the 1950s, but without success. The army embraced the idea 
of parachute insertion around 1960, an idea promoted by officers in the cavalry. As a 
result, Hærens fallskjermjegerskole [The Army’s Paratrooper School] was established in 
1962.17 The school’s goal was to educate around 200 soldiers a year for the infantry and 
the cavalry. By the mid-1960s, the school was organized into four different elements: 
management, instructors, riggers, and a paratrooper platoon. By the late 1960s, the Army 
wanted to increase the size of the paratrooper platoon to two paratrooper commands; 
when fully mobilized, the two commands should total 400 men.18 
To communicate its reorientation from using parachutes strictly as a means of 
insertion to also focusing on its job on the ground, the unit changed its name to Hærens 
Jegerskole (HJS) [The Army’s Ranger School] in 1971.19 The paratroopers’ main focus 
over the next decade was long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP). Annually, the unit 
trained around 30–40 new conscripts as paratroopers. The size of the staff of the unit 
increased to a total of 17 officers and one civilian by the start of the 1980s.20 
In the wake of the 1972 Munich Olympics terror attack, Europe saw the creation 
of many new special units to deal specifically with this “new” threat. Norway response 
was to create Beredskapstroppen [The Norwegian Police Emergency Response Unit] in 
1976. This new response unit was organized within the police as an anti-terror, hostage 
rescue, and high risk arrest unit, and was based in Norway’s capital, Oslo.  
At the same time, Norway discovered oil in the North Sea and was concerned 
about protecting this resource from terrorists. Consequently, the Norwegian government 
appointed a committee that same year that recommended that the armed forces should 
17 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 170. 
18 Ibid., 173. 
19 John Inge Hammersmark, “Utviklingen av norske spesialstyrker: symbolikk eller militær 
nytteverdi?” [The Development of Norwegian Special Operation Forces] (master’s thesis, Forsvarets 
stabsskole [The Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College], 2010) 15. 
20 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 178. 
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likewise establish a special unit to assist the police regarding off-shore counter-terrorism. 
The committee’s main argument was that the police would not be suited to handle 
combat-like situations in coastal waters.21 Several different options regarding the shape 
and size of the unit were discussed, and the committee responsible for making a final 
recommendation to the Chief of Defence suggested that a new unit of 38 men should be 
established. Eighteen of the men should be from the HJS, sixteen from Marinejegerlaget 
(MJL, the precursor to MJK), and four should be explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
experts.22 In the spring of 1982, the Chief of Defence made his decision. He feared that if 
he followed the committee’s recommendation, MJL would not be able to fulfil its tasks in 
the northern parts of Norway. Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK) should therefore be 
established as a unit under HJS, containing specially trained paratroopers.23 Supported by 
the British Special Air Service and Special Boat Service, HJS did a remarkable job 
standing itself up, and on June 1, 1984, the 38 men unit, FSK, was declared operational.24 
Throughout the 1990s, HJS received praise for its work over the course of 
multiple deployments to the Balkans. In 1997 the unit changed its name to Hærens 
Jegerkommando (HJK) to communicate that the unit was no longer a school institution, 
but a special unit on standby for both national and international missions.25 The unit grew 
in size and eventually was comprised of a battalion size staff, two assault squadrons, and 
multiple support squadrons.26 The unit deployed multiple times to Afghanistan in the 
2000s and continued to grow. In 2004 the unit was placed organizationally directly under 
the Chief of the Army with a lieutenant colonel as Commanding Officer (see Figure 1). 
Today the name of the unit is Forsvarets Spesialkommando. The size of the unit is 
classified, but a full colonel is the Commanding Officer and, as of January 1, 2014, it is 
part of the newly established Forsvarets Spesialstyrker.  
21 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 200. 
22 Ibid., 203. 
23 Ibid., 204. 
24 John Inge Hammersmark, “Utviklingen av norske spesialstyrker: symbolikk eller militær 
nytteverdi?,” 16. 
25 Ibid., 16. 
26 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 242. 
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Figure 1.  The Norwegian Army in 2009 
C. MARINEJEGERKOMMANDOEN 
When the reconstruction of the Norwegian Armed Forces accelerated in the 
1950s, the Royal Norwegian Navy decided to establish a frogman unit in the winter of 
1951-1952.27 Experiences during WWII proved that a frogman unit could be an effective 
tool and the intent was that Norwegian frogmen should be able to conduct underwater 
sabotage, beach reconnaissance, and mine clearance operations. To gain knowledge and 
insight, the navy decided to send one of Norway’s diving pioneers, Navy Lieutenant Ove 
Lund, to the United States to train with the US Navy’s elite special purpose force, the 
Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT).28 In March the following year, Lund held the first 
frogman selection course at Bolærne fortress in the Oslofjord, clearly inspired by the 
UDT’s method of selection.29  
During the 1960s, the number of tasks assigned to the unit and its numbers of 
required specialty increased. Therefore, the navy decided to appoint a group to look at 
these challenges. The group recommended that the unit should be split in two in 1968: 
with an offensive element to be called Marinejegere (MJ) and a defensive element called 
Minedykkere. The defensive element should focus on underwater explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD), while the offensive element should focus on reconnaissance and 
27 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 123. 
28 Ibid., 126. 
29 Ibid., 126.  
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sabotage in coastal areas. The navy wanted the offensive element, Marinejegerlaget 
(MJL), to consist of 15 MJs on active service and another 15 who could be mobilized.30 
Although the size of the unit had only increased to 21 men by the end of the 
1970s, the unit’s capabilities had increased significantly. The Norwegian supreme 
commander for northern Norway had decided that MJL should be capable of conducting 
joint special operation missions. As a result, the unit was assigned new long-range 
communications equipment and started to train with the rest of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces. These measures increased the unit’s expertise and overall operational output.31 
At the end of the 1980s MJL started to realize that in order to meet expectations 
and standards it had to spend less time educating new conscripts32 and more time on 
developing new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). In 1992 MJL changed its name 
to Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK). By the mid-1990s the unit consisted of around 30 
active duty officers and NCOs. They were organized into a management section, an 
operations section, a logistics section, and the patrols. The Commanding Officer at the 
time had the rank of lieutenant commander.33 For a mobilization exercise in 1998, MJK 
mobilized all of its men and the unit was 160 men strong, with ten patrols in the field.34 
During the 1990s, personnel from the unit were also exposed to international operations 
for the first time in the Balkan conflict.  
In the beginning of the 2000s, the Commanding Officer had the rank of 
Commander and the unit continued with its organizational development. The multiple 
deployments to Afghanistan during this decade helped MJK to convince military and 
political leaders that the unit needed additional funding and personnel in order to reach its 
full potential. From 2004 till 2007 the unit was re-organized into four squadrons and a 
30 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 132. 
31 Ibid., 166. 
32 Most of the MJ’s at the time were conscripts who served their mandatory service. They were 
discharged after 15 months of service, but could be recalled if the armed forces were mobilized or for larger 
exercises.   
33 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 268. 
34 Ibid., 270.   
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battalion staff:35 Alfa (assault squadron), Bravo (training and education squadron), Echo 
(special boat squadron), and Lima (combat service and support).36 Up until 2005 MJK 
had only selected and trained one type of operator, namely the Marinejeger (MJ). But 
from 2005 an additional type of operator was selected and trained, the Spesialbåtoperatør 
(SBO). Norway’s littoral waters are one of the most demanding areas in which to operate 
and the unit recognized the need for specialists in the littoral domain; the SBOs were 
designed to fill this role.37 
Up until January 1, 2012, MJK had organizationally been under various sub- 
commands of the Coastal Flotilla (see Figure 2). After an internal reorganization, the unit 
now reported directly to the Chief of Naval Operations; the command and control lines 
became shorter; and MJK was placed at the same level as FSK in the Army. The actual 
size of MJK is classified, but in an interview with a Norwegian newspaper in 2013 the 
Commanding Officer stated that MJK had around 200 persons. He would not, however, 
answer the question of how many of these were MJs or SBOs.38As of January 1, 2014, 
MJK is no longer part of the Royal Norwegian Navy. It now belongs to the newly 
established Forsvarets Spesialstyrker. 
 
Figure 2.  MJK and the Royal Norwegian Navy after January 1, 2012 
35 The staff had a typical structure, N1–N8. 
36 Melien, Våre Hemmelige Soldater, 273. 
37 Ibid., 273. 
38 Bente-Line Svellingen Flatekvål, “Marinejegere er Northug i uniform,” BA, April 20, 2013, 
http://www.ba.no/nyheter/article6613979.ece, accessed January 2014. 
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D. ATTEMPTED MERGERS 
Since the 1970s, there have been recurring attempts and deliberations to merge 
the respective Norwegian Special Operation Forces, initiated both by the Army and the 
Navy, with divergent approaches reflecting different reasoning, legitimacy, assessments,  
and solutions. In 1970 a merger was suggested, but did not occur. In 1976, and in 
subsequent years, it was again discussed. Instead, FSK was established and became 
operational in 1984. Toward the end of the 1980’s, with the end of the Cold War, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces was forced to be more economically vigilant and FSK came 
under evaluation. Termination of both MJK and HJK was also scrutinized, but was never 
enacted. The possibility for a merger popped up again in 1997, and was further 
deliberated on in 2003, but the Minister of Defence did not bring the case to Parliament. 
Since 2001, both SOF units have repeatedly deployed to Afghanistan and other theaters, 
and the importance of having such capabilities has been reinforced. In addition, the 
terrorist attacks in Norway in the summer of 2011 underscored the need for having both 
of these capable units available to support the police in counter-terrorism operations 
domestically.  
At the same time, over the last fifteen years, FSK and MJK have competed for 
tasks and operational legitimacy, an assertion backed up by the fact that the two units are 
similar when it comes to capabilities and have both been active (deployed) in the same 
theaters. Yet, deployments have not been joint. For the majority of the time they have 
been in succession. It is fair to say that, as a consequence, the relationship between the 
two tactical units has not been healthy or efficient. Tellingly, when the future 
organizational design for the merged forces was publicly highlighted in 2012-2013, 
members of both units reacted. There are limited reliable unclassified sources describing 
the process of a possible merger and/or realignment of the two forces. Nevertheless, some 
of the publicly available discourse is important to review in order to contextualize recent 
views about each unit’s status, and to set the conditions for understanding the possible 
ramifications of this thesis. 
In order to avoid biases and gossip, we have focused solely on public discourse 
provided by Norsk Rikskringkasting [Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation] (NRK).  In 
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February 2013, the CHOD announced recommendations for the future organization of the 
Norwegian Special Operation Forces. He suggested keeping one tactical squadron from 
MJK at Haakonsvern Naval Base, Bergen, Norway (main naval base situated in 
southwest Norway). In addition, he suggested keeping an element in Ramsund (the 
northern base for MJK) in order to have redundancy/readiness in northern Norway. The 
remaining parts of MJK would be moved to Rena, Oslo, and FSK would constitute the 
main part of the Norwegian Special Operation Forces, including a joint command for the 
entire force. The rationale for this recommendation was to increase: (1) combat power, 
and (2) readiness by putting the two tactical units under one joint command. While the 
rationale may have been good, by assimilating MJK into FSK at Rena the implication 
was the end of MJK as an organic force. The next few months were consequently rough 
for the Norwegian Special Forces. The Armed Forces leadership, with the CHOD being 
the most significant actor under review, was scrutinized and deliberately put on the spot 
for an absence of leadership skills and for lacking a holistic, unbiased approach regarding 
the future organization of the Norwegian Special Operation Forces, whose ends, ways, 
and means were not in alignment with governing political guidelines. The CHOD was 
accused of being incompetent when appointing the new Commander of SOA, the 
precursor of FS, [The Norwegian] Special Operation Division. There were also 
allegations of eavesdropping on employees of MJK conducted by the very same officer. 
Some employees of MJK were characterized as whistleblowers, and their identities were 
made public. On April 22, 2013, CHOD and the Norwegian Minister of Defence 
announced that FSK and MJK were to be put under a joint command located in Oslo. 
This was regarded as a compromise solution given that the senior leadership in the 
Norwegian Armed Forces had first suggested assimilating MJK into FSK. The Minister 
of Defence was critiqued for not taking the allegations of incompetence, eavesdropping, 
and threats seriously enough, and it was suggested that the merger process should be put 
on hold until the apparent issues were resolved, or at least eliminated. All parties were 
later acquitted and the future organizational design for the Special Forces was politically 
decided with CHOD in agreement. It was explicitly stated that MJK would exist as an 
organic unit and that the overall organizational change was not the first step in merging 
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the two tactical units. The Commander of SOA was replaced by Rear Admiral Nils Johan 
Holte who took command of the newly established FS January 2014.      
E. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FORSVARETS SPESIALSTYRKER 
JANUARY 1, 2014  
It is important to look ahead. I am encouraging all employees to look 
ahead and put the old history behind them. This reorganization gives us 
an opportunity to state good and consistent goals for the future—
together.39   
As described in the previous section, there have been previous attempts to merge 
FSK and MJK. The attempts have had different flavors, different characters, and different 
rationales. They have also taken into account different factors and analyses according to 
the situation at the time. Nevertheless, the establishment of FS can be considered a step in 
a merger process, even though it does not technically constitute a merger. 
SOA was established in 2012. The Division was organizationally placed within 
the Defence Staff. SOA had coordinating authority over FSK and MJK, and the Joint 
Headquarters had operational authority. The organizational change/adaption was made 
based on the perceived advantages of shorter lines of command and enhanced 
information flow. In addition, SOA would be a division that could facilitate holistic 
planning and use of Norwegian Special Operation Forces. During SOA’s existence, the 
plan for the Norwegian Special Operation Forces was greatly debated. The 2012 Long 
Term Planning Document, a four-year planning document, provided by CHOD, required 
a study of the Special Forces. In addition, the terror incident of July 22, 2011 identified 
lessons to be incorporated into improved national counter-terrorism-readiness which 
included military forces, especially FSK and MJK.40  
On March 31, 2014, RADM Nils Johan Holte gave a speech in Oslo. We attended 
this gathering and below is an excerpt focusing on organizational culture in FS (translated 
by the authors into English): 
39 RADM Nils Johan Holte, Commander FS, January 13, 2014. http://www.nrk.no/norge/_-vi-ma-
leggje-konflikta-bak-oss-1.11467553, accessed January 14, 2014. 
40 Alexandra Bech Gjørv et al., “Rapport fra 22. Juli-kommisjonen” [22 July Commision Report] 
(Norges Offentlige utredninger, Oslo, 2012).  
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May I speak about organizational culture in the Norwegian Special Forces, 
with a careful reference to last year's reports in the press, that any negative 
impressions that they may have established upon themselves. 
All top leaders who have gathered previously separate organizations under 
a common management emphasize the cultural dimension, because a 
unified and recognized corporate culture — can be which all employees 
identify with — and the vision and goals that can be recognized and 
supported by all staff, are considered important factors to the success of 
the new joint organization. It often calls for unifying symbols and 
common slogans, and common provisions for profiling. 
This is also my focus since the establishment of FS has collected two 
organizations that were previously separated. I understand that many are 
of the opinion that FS has two different organizational cultures consisting 
of two groups which in many ways are separate. After ten weeks in the 
job, I have already concluded that this is not an accurate picture. 
Obviously there are cultural differences between FSK and MJK. The two 
units have developed in each of their respective military branches. 
Cultural differences are fairly obvious between the Army and Navy, and 
this is also reflected in MJK and FSK. 
Do MJK and FSK represent two different organizational cultures? My 
answer to that question is a little yes, but mostly no. 
After visiting both units and having talked about the future — where we 
must go together — I perceive that we are all looking in the same direction 
and have an overall desire that FS will succeed. And I have found that the 
differences are clearly dominated by cultural similarities as these are 
developed from a specialized concurrence in the mission, equipment, 
operational focus, selection of personnel, operational experience, etc. 
I am set to establish a new branch of the Armed Forces structure — on a 
par with the other armed services. And like the other commanders, it is 
also my goal that my organization will be characterized by a positive 
community, respect, and a willingness to develop into the future — 
together. We should be able to make it, while we accept and respect some 
peculiarities, both at Haakonsvern [Navy Base] and Rena [Army Camp]. 
Both units will also in the future continue to cultivate close relations with 
the two armed services from which they originated. 
The starting point for creating a recognizable and positive FS culture is, 
with us as with other organizations, to bolster confidence within the 
organization between individuals, groups, and departments. To the extent 
that trust is an issue, it is challenging for us. Confidence may in fact not be 
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ordered or implemented. Confidence must be created and strengthened 
through a process over time. 
My strategy is to facilitate constructive interaction within FS. Focusing on 
the interaction — and dual demonstration of competence at the point of 
contact — will ensure that trust emerges in all of FS. 
Decisions will eventually be made on my part that will not necessarily be 
popular with everyone, but if our organization is characterized by trust it 
will also be able to absorb things that are perceived as challenging — 
without division and negative communication through the media. 
I am sure that we who serve in Special Operation Forces together will 
succeed in creating and consolidating an organization characterized by 
solidarity. But it is ultimately up to objective observers to confirm whether 
and when this goal is reached. We must in fact be perceived as such, 
before we can credibly argue that we actually have met this prerequisite 
for future optimal development.41  
Holte, after ten weeks as Commanding Officer for FS, spoke directly to the issue 
at the heart of this thesis regarding culture and possible discrepancies when cultures meet 
in a unifying process. It is interesting to note that some of his conclusions touch on some 
of the potential findings in our analysis of survey data and our literature review. 
Comparative analysis between his perceptions and our findings is not meant to represent 
the core of this thesis, but it would be unwise of us to not point out certain discrepancies 
as well that might be able to shed light on the challenges when it comes to forging 
Norwegian Special Operation Forces. Some of the bullet points we extracted from the 
speech are as follows: 
• The cultural dimension is important in unifying previously separated units. 
• FSK and MJK are not notably different when it comes to organizational 
culture. Cultural similarities outweigh differences. 
• Everyone in FS is looking in the same direction and has an overall desire 
for FS to succeed. 
41 Nils Johan Holte, “Norske spesialstyrker i støpeskjeen – hva innebærer reformene?” [NORSOF in 
its ladle] (speech, Oslo Militære Samfund, March 31, 2014), accessed April 13, 2014, 
http://www.oslomilsamfund.no/oms_arkiv/2014/2014-03-31-Holte.pdf. The speech was translated into 
English by the authors. 
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• Both FSK and MJK will also in the future continue to cultivate close 
relations with the two armed services they originated from [authors’ 
comment: a merger of the two tactical units is not under consideration]. 
• The CO’s strategy is to facilitate constructive interaction within the whole 
of FS. 
• The CO is optimistic that those who serve in Special Operation Forces 
together will succeed in creating and consolidating an organization 
characterized by solidarity. 
   January 1, 2014, FS was established as depicted in Figure 3. The vision is that 
FS shall be a unique, flexible, and reliable security policy asset which possesses a high 




Figure 3.  Organizational Chart, FS 
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III. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
In order to manage culture, you must understand what culture is, what 
content culture covers, and how to assess it.42 
 
Since Andrew M. Pettigrew first introduced the term “organizational culture” in 
1979, several scholars have helped to shape the way we understand the concept of 
organizational culture today.43 Two books from 1982 presented business leaders with the 
idea that organizational culture was “the big answer” to why some organizations succeed 
and others do not.44 Research on this topic exploded and two different schools of thought 
emerged: (1) those who thought that an organization had a culture and it could be 
changed, and (2) those who thought that an organization is culture and it could not be 
changed.45 
Most contemporary research falls somewhere in between these two extremes. 
Inspired by the works of Edgar Schein and Daniel Denison we will focus on the concept 
that an organization has a culture and it can be changed. We further endorse Schein’s 
statement that there are better and worse cultures, that different cultures can be stronger 
or weaker, and that the “right” kind of culture will have an impact on how efficient an 
organization is.46 
  
42 Edgar Schein, The Corporate Culture Survival Guide (San Francisco: Jossey – Bass, 2009), 1. 
43 Andrew M. Pettigrew, On Studying Organizational Culture, Administative Science Quarterly, Vol. 
24, No. 4 (Dec., 1979). Accessed February 15, 2014, http://www.cnr.it/benessere-
organizzativo/docs/bibliografia/96.pdf. 
44 The two books were: Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman. In search of excellence. (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1982); Terrence E. Deal and Allan A. Kennedy, Corporate cultures, (Reading, Mass: 
Addison – Wesley, 1982).  
45 Henning Bang, Organisasjonskultur [Oganizational Culture] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2011), 
141. 
46 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 4th ed. (San Francisco: Jossey – Bass, 
2010), 35. 
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A. THE CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
Culture is to a group what personality or character is to an individual.47 
1. Organizational Culture Defined 
As with most topics in social science, the concept of culture has had a long 
history. It is believed that the anthropologist Edward B. Tylor was the first who tried to 
define the term in 1871. According to Tylor, culture was “that complex whole which 
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, and any other capabilities and 
habits acquired by man as a member of society.”48 Since then, several other definitions 
have been presented and although it seems impossible for researchers to agree on a single 
one, most seem to agree on the content. One of the things that makes culture a difficult 
concept hard to define is that parts of it are very abstract. Schein suggests that for there to 
be culture it must have these four characteristics:49 (1) stability, (2) depth, (3) breadth, 
and (4) patterning or integration.  
According to Schein, cultures have some level of structural stability; stability is 
not only shared within the group, but also defines it. He elaborates by saying that the 
culture is a stabilizing force because it survives even if some of the group’s members 
leave, and it is therefore hard to change because most people value stability. The concept 
must also have depth, Schein’s second characteristic. In his view, culture is the deepest, 
unconscious part of the group and is therefore less tangible and less visible. After the 
culture has developed, it suffuses all of the group’s actions; this is his third characteristic. 
The last characteristic, patterning or integration, refers to the fact that the culture ties 
various elements like rituals, climate, values, and behaviors together into a coherent 
whole. In Schein’s schema, this is the essence of what we should mean by culture and it 
derives from the human need to make our environment as sensible and orderly as we 
can.50 
 47 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 36.   
48 Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture (London: J. Murray, 1871). 
49 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, ,, 38. 
50 Ibid., 39. 
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In a nutshell, then, Schein’s concept of culture is: 
A pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has 
worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to 
new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems.51 
With this definition, Schein highlights the two major sets of problems that all 
groups must deal with regardless of their size: (1) external adaptation, meaning the 
problems of survival and adaptation to the environment surrounding the group, and (2) 
internal integration, which refers to problems with the integration of the group’s internal 
processes to ensure that the group is still able to survive and adapt. 
A final thing to note about organizational culture is that, according to Schein, 
culture can be developed in any group as long as the following three conditions are met: 
(1) the group has been together long enough to have shared significant problems, (2) the 
group has had opportunities to solve these problems and to observe the effects of its 
solutions, and (3) the group has taken in new members and has passed on these 
solutions.52   
As previously mentioned, FS has only existed since January 1, 2014 and to our 
knowledge the new entity has yet to fulfill these three conditions. In FFI’s survey FS’s 
employees were asked to consider the following statement: “There is an established 
organizational culture in FS.” 43 percent of the respondents agreed, 26 percent were 
neutral, and 31 percent disagreed with the statement (see Figure 4).53 This result tells us 
that for the time being there is not an established organizational culture that is shared 
throughout the organization.  
 51 Schein, Organizational culture and leadership, 40. 
52 Edgar H. Schein, Coming to a New Awareness of Organizational Culture, Sloan Management 
Review, Winter 1984, 5. Accessed March 10, 2014, https://blog.itu.dk/SFOL-
F2013/files/2013/03/culture_schein.pdf. 
53 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 15 percent strongly disagreed, 16 percent disagreed, 
26 percent were neutral, 22 percent agreed, and 21 percent strongly agreed. 
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Figure 4.  Organizational culture in FS 
That does not mean that there is no organizational culture in FS; it simply means 
that FS’s organizational culture, for the time being, is comprised of the organizational 
cultures of both FSK and MJK. Figure 5 shows that most of FS’s employees (96 percent) 
have a background from either of these two units.54 Although some are currently working 
on the FSST staff, they were socialized into and enculturated by their respective unit. 
Taking into account people’s formative enculturation, then, leads us to focus on the 
organizational cultures of FSK and MJK for the remainder of this chapter, since these 
two cultures will be the building blocks for FS’s organizational culture. 
54 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 57 percent of FS consist of people with a 
background from FSK, 39 percent from MJK, and only 4 percent of the employees have a background from 
neither.  
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Figure 5.  Employee background in FS 
2. Functional, Dysfunctional, Weak, and Strong Organizational Culture 
Before we describe the content of these two cultures, we should offer a 
clarification. Instead of referring to a culture as good or bad, as people normally do in 
everyday language, we think it is more valuable to examine whether the culture is 
functional or dysfunctional with regard to the organization’s goals.55 Vijay Sathe 
presents the idea that one can determine the functionality of the organization’s culture by 
looking at cultural strength and cultural content.56 Cultural strength can be described by 
using three dimensions:57 (1) the degree of sociological penetration, (2) the degree of 
psychological penetration, and (3) the degree of historical penetration. The first 
dimension refers to how many of the organization’s members actually share the same 
culture; is there one or can we find many subcultures? Psychological penetration refers to 
how deeply shared the content of the culture is between the members; the more intense 
experiences the members share, the stronger the culture will be. How long the culture has 
existed and how stable the membership has been are captured by the degree of historical 
 55 Bang, Organisasjonskultur, 117. 
56 Vijay Sathe, Culture and Related Corporate Realities (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 
1985). 
57 Bang. Organisasjonskultur, 110. 
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penetration; the longer the organization has existed and the less turnover it has had, the 
stronger the culture. 
When applying this to FSK and MJK we find that both units have a strong 
organizational culture along all three dimensions. When it comes to their line of work, 
members of the units share intense experiences both at home, during training and 
exercises, and abroad when executing missions in hostile environments. Since the onset 
of the Afghanistan campaign in 2001, both units have lost operators at home and in 
Afghanistan.58 This, combined with each unit’s rigorous selection program, has 
reinforced both the sociological and psychological penetration of the culture for the 
operators. Worth nothing is that most employees in FSK and MJK are not operators; 
instead, they work on a staff or in support positions. However, since the core of the 
organizational output is the operators, they have the leading role in forming the 
organizational culture. How intensely the “non-operators” share the culture is unknown 
for us; our experience tells us that most do.  
 
Figure 6.  Number of years in FSK / MJK 
58 FSK: Rasmus Alme during an exercise in Norway 2005 and Tor Arne Lau-Henriksen in Afghanistan 
2007. 
MJK: Trond André Bolle in Afghanistan 2010 and Magnus Rubach Wendt during an exercise in 
Norway 2011. 
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Figure 6 depicts the number of years employees have been at FSK / MJK. 62 
percent of FSK’s employees have been at the unit for 5 years or more. 51 percent of 
MJK’s employees have been at MJK for 5 years or more.59 We can therefore say that the 
historical penetration is high for both units.  
As mentioned previously, the functionality of the organizational culture must also 
be determined by cultural content. To examine content we will use Schein’s classic 
approach of dividing culture into three levels.60 
3. The Three Levels of Culture 
As with defining organizational culture, researchers within the field have not 
reached a consensus on how to operationalize the concept. Edgar Schein argues that at 
the root of an organization’s culture are basic underlying assumptions. These assumptions 
are the “unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs and values that determine behavior, 
perception, thought and feelings.”61 Official values and rules that normally can be found 
in philosophies or public statements represent the second level. These espoused beliefs 
and values are derived from the basic underlying assumptions. The third level is 
comprised of something Schein calls artifacts; these are the culture’s visible and feelable 
structures, processes, and behaviors. 
Daniel Denison et al use the image of an iceberg in the book Leading Culture 
Change in Global Organizations to depict Schein’s three levels (see Figure 7).62 Only 
about ten percent of an iceberg is visible above the water. Think of this as the culture’s 
artifacts. The remaining ninety percent is below the surface and just as it is these parts 
that will sink a ship, it is these parts -the espoused beliefs and values, and the basic 
underlying assumptions- that will get an organization into trouble. 
59 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
60 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 45. 
61 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 46. 
62 Daniel Denison et al., Leading Culture Change in Global Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, 2012), 3. 
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Figure 7.  The three levels of culture 
Schein points out that to map or measure these three levels takes time and can be 
difficult.63 He suggests that one can start by looking at the different categories of 
culture.64 The categories are: macrocultures, organizational cultures, subcultures, and 
microcultures. Macrocultures are the national, ethnic, religious, and occupational 
cultures that exist globally. As mentioned previously in the thesis, Schein defines 
organizational culture as all kinds of private, public, government, and nonprofit 
organizations. Various occupational groups that make up these organizations are called 
subcultures. Each of these consists of microsystems, or microcultures. If we look at FSK 
and MJK they share a lot of cultural similarities (see Figure 8).  
 
63 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 46. 
64 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 46. 
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 Figure 8.  Cultural categories FSK and MJK 
Both cultures derive from the same macro culture, which is Norway, and both 
reside within the same organizational culture, the Norwegian Armed Forces. As the 
reader knows by now, FSK’s culture derives from the Army and MJK’s from the Navy. 
The Norwegian Navy works with the Norwegian Army at all levels all of the time, so 
there should not, in theory, be any cultural hindrances between FSK and MJK. Carl H. 
Builder writes in the book The Masks of War65 that each military service has its own 
distinct culture, which explains why the services act the way they do. Although Builder’s 
book is written about the United States Services, we have no reason to believe that his 
arguments do not apply to Norway as well. This underscores our previous point that in 
theory there should not be any cultural hindrances, but reality has shown that there are.  
Something that traps many people when it comes to mapping and measuring the 
three levels of culture is that people have a tendency to infer the things that are “below 
the surface” strictly on the basis of what they see “above.”66 For example, if you are used 
to a very formal organization and you meet an organization that is very informal, you 
may regard that organization as “inefficient.” Alternatively, if you are used to a very 
informal organization and meet a formal one, you may think that the organization lacks 
innovation and creativity skills. Schein also points out that the “deeper” one gets, -to 
level two or three-, the harder it is to change. The reason for this is that if our underlying 
65 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989) 
66 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership,  47. 
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assumptions are challenged, this destabilizes our cognitive and interpersonal world and 
creates anxiety.67 Schein’s solution is to keep cultural assumptions intact by not declaring 
one or the other “wrong,” instead one must offer a third assumption.68 
As far as we know there is only one research project that specifically has looked 
at culture within NORSOF. Tom Robertsen, the current Commanding Officer of MJK 
initiated a project when he took over as CO in 2010. Tone Danielsen, an anthropologist, 
was brought in and spent a year and a half with the unit to examine its culture. Tom 
hoped that she could help the unit answer the questions: what distinct cultural features did 
it have to keep to retain its “soul,” and what should it shed in order to meet the demands 
of a modern organization? The project resulted in a report that touched on all three of 
Schein’s cultural levels.69 There has been no similar qualitative work done on FSK; 
although books have been written about the unit, none is specifically about culture.70 In 
order for us to make a comparison of the two units’ cultures we therefore needed another 
tool. The only viable option was to use a more quantitative method, namely to analyze 
the data we were given access to by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
(FFI). 
Before we turn to that data collected by FFI we would like to summarize this 
section of the thesis. FS has only existed since January 1, 2014. Therefore, the 
organizational culture is, for the time being, comprised of the organizational cultures of 
FSK and MJK. Both of these cultures are functional, a conclusion we arrived at by 
looking at their cultural strength and cultural content. Both share a lot of similarities and, 
in theory, there should not be any cultural hindrances between them.  
  
67 Ibid., 51. 
68 Ibid., 53. 
69 Tone Danielsen, Hos oss sitter kulturen i hjertet [Here the culture is in our hearts], Kjeller, 
Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2012. 
70 See for example Tom Bakkeli, Krigere og Diplomater [Warriors and Diplomats], (Oslo: Kagge, 
2013).  
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B. FORSVARETS SPESIALRTYRKER’S CULTURE 
1. Organizational Culture and Performance 
Since the advent of organizational research in the 1980s, several empirical studies 
have shown that there is a linkage between a functional culture and good organizational 
performance.71 Social psychologists have therefore tried to develop a measurement tool 
that measures only the parts of the culture that are related to performance. Many different 
models have been developed and in this research we will focus on Daniel R. Denison’s 
method and model (see Figure 9).72  
 
Figure 9.  The Denison Model 
In the center of Denison’s model we find Beliefs and Assumptions. We can think 
of these as Schein’s three levels of culture. It is important to emphasize that Denison’s 
model does not set out to measure these “deeper” levels; it is a tool only meant to 
measure the aspects of culture that are related to performance. According to Denison, in 
order for an organization to be effective it must master four key traits. He calls these 
Mission, Consistency, Involvement, and Adaptability.   
71 Bang, Organisasjonskultur, 127. 
 72 Denison et al., Leading Cultural Change in Global Organizations, 8. 
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Mission refers to the degree to which an organization has a clear sense of purpose 
and direction. Consistency is whether the organization has a system of values and 
behavior that is concise and integrated. How well the organization empowers and 
engages its people is measured by Involvement. And lastly, Adaptability is the degree 
to which the organization translates environmental demands into action and has the 
capacity and experience to change its goals and objectives.  
As Figure 9 illustrates, each of the four traits consists of three indexes. For 
instance the Mission trait consists of “Strategic Direction & Intent,” “Goals & 
Objectives,” and “Vision.”73 
“Strategic Direction & Intent” refers to the multi-year strategies developed by the 
organization. The intent behind this index is to measure whether the organization has 
established high priorities to “operationalize” the organization`s vision. 
Whether the organization has established specific, short-term goals that help every 
employee see how his/her daily activities connect to the vision and the strategy is 
measured in the index “Goals & Objectives.” 
“Vision” is the last index under the Mission trait. The intent of this index is to 
depict whether the people of the organization think that the organization has a clear sense 
of what the ultimate reason is for its existence. Hence, does the organization have a clear 
purpose? 
The Consistency trait consists of “Core Values,” “Agreement,” and 
“Coordination & Integration.”74 
High-performing organizations have a clear set of “Core Values” that help 
employees and leaders make consistent decisions and behave in a consistent manner. 
The “Agreement” index refers to how well the organization engages its people in 
dialogue and gets multiple perspectives on the table in order to reach an agreement on 
difficult issues and problems. 
73 “The Denison Organizational Culture Model,” Denison Consulting, accessed April 19, 2014, 
http://www.denisonconsulting.com/model-surveys/denison-model/ocs-mission. 
74 “The Denison Organizational Culture Model,” Denison Consulting, accessed April 19, 2014, 
http://www.denisonconsulting.com/model-surveys/denison-model/ocs-consistency. 
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How well the organization coordinates and integrates the work to serve the 
organization as a whole is measured by the index “Coordination & Integration.” A high 
score on this index normally indicates that employees of the organization understand how 
the work that they do impacts others and how other's work impacts them.  
The Involvement trait consists of “Empowerment,” “Team Orientation,” and 
“Capability Development.”75 
“Empowerment” refers to the term “informed” empowerment, which means that 
the organization has clarified those areas where employees can make decisions, provide 
input, or are beyond an employee’s scope of responsibility. 
“Team Orientation” seeks to measure whether teamwork is encouraged so that 
creative ideas are captured and employees support one another in accomplishing work 
goals.  
The final index under the Involvement trait is “Capability Development.” This is 
practiced in a variety of ways, including through training, coaching, and exposing 
employees to new roles and responsibilities.   
And finally, the Adaptability trait consists of “Creating Change,” “Customer 
Focus,” and “Organizational Learning.”76 
High-performing organizations welcome new ideas, are willing to try new 
approaches to doing things, and consider “Creating Change” important to how they do 
business. 
The “Customer Focus” index measures to what degree the employees recognize 
the need to serve both internal and external customers and continually seek new and 
improved ways to meet customer expectations. 
“Organizational Learning” refers to whether “thoughtful” risk-taking is 
encouraged or not. “Organizational Learning” means that the organization gains 
75 “The Denison Organizational Culture Model,” Denison Consulting, accessed April 19, 2014, 
http://www.denisonconsulting.com/model-surveys/denison-model/ocs-involvement. 
76 “The Denison Organizational Culture Model,” Denison Consulting, accessed April 19, 2014, 
http://www.denisonconsulting.com/model-surveys/denison-model/ocs-adaptability. 
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knowledge from successes and failures, or that the first reaction to reasonable mistakes is 
not “Who is to blame?” but rather “What can we learn?” 
At the core of the Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS) is a 60-
question survey. Participants are tasked to consider five statements on each of the twelve 
indexes just described. The participants use a five-point Likert scale, where 1= strongly 
disagree and 5 = strongly agree.77 The results are presented in a circumplex report that 
contains benchmarked data. This means that the results are compared to Denison 
Consulting’s database that contains results from thousands of organizations. The results 
are presented in percentile scores, which indicate the percentage of organizations in the 
benchmark database that scored lower than the targeted organization. For example, a 
percentile score of 67 means that the organization scored higher than 67 percent of the 
organizations in the database. 
As mentioned earlier, all organizations must deal with two problems at the same 
time: external adaptation and internal integration. Related to these problems, Denison 
highlights four tensions that an organization must deal with: the trade-off between 
focusing internally and focusing externally, and the trade-off between stability and 
flexibility.78  In the model we can see, for instance, that an organization that scores high 
on Involvement and Consistency will tend to have an internal focus, while an 
organization that scores high on Adaptability and Mission will tend to have an external 
focus. In addition to these tensions, the model also presents the diagonal tension between 
internal Consistency and external Adaptability, and the “top-down” versus “bottom-up” 
tension between Mission and Involvement.79 
As responsible researchers we would like to underscore one important point 
before we present FS’s results. This requires us to cite Schein from the foreword to 
Daniel Denison et al.’s book, Leading Cultural Change in Global Organizations:80     
77 Denison et al., Leading Cultural Change in Global Organizations, 174. 
78 Ibid., 9. 
79 Ibid., 9. 
80 Ibid., x. 
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Culture measures have evolved and can be used creatively and 
responsibly. I say responsibly, because I have always been critical of those 
who used culture surveys when they simply assumed that they knew what 
to measure in the first place and then fed the results back to the 
organization without considering how this might help or hinder what the 
organization was trying to do. 
2. Forsvarets Spesialstyrker 
Denison’s empirical research has shown that high performing organizations have 
high cultural scores in all four traits.81 This means that an organization that scores high 
performs better than an organization that scores low. At first glance FS’s circumplex 
report (see Figure 10) tells us that there is room for improvement, and especially within 
the Mission and Consistency traits. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Circumplex report Forsvarets Spesialstyrker  
Before we go into the details on each trait and index we would like to take a brief 
look at the statistical data that comprise the circumplex report (see Table 1).  
81 Denison et al., Leading Culture Change in Global Organizations, 6. 
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Table 1.   Mean score Denison Organizational Culture Survey 
As mentioned in the last section of the thesis, the mean score in Table 1 represents 
how much the participants disagree or agree with the statements in the different indexes 
(1= strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). It is also important to note that the score 
represents that unit’s thoughts on FS’s culture, not the unit’s culture. Of the 12 indexes, 
MJK has the lowest score on 10 of the 12. This clearly shows that MJK is the unit that 
shows most skepticism toward FS. We think that the incidents described in Chapter Two 
of this thesis help explain this; members of MJK felt they were on the verge of being 
abolished. Although that did not happen, a residue of skepticism probably remains. 
In an interview conducted when he took over as the CO of FS, RADM Nils Johan 
Holte encouraged all of FS’s employees to look ahead and put their old (bad) history 
behind them.82 We think that the results shown in Table 1 indicate that before FS’s 
employees can put their old history behind them, the past must be reconciled. Hence, the 
organization must actively address the perceived wrongs committed during the merger 
process.  
We would now like to shift the focus back to the circumplex report and go into 
details on what the reports tells us about FS. 
82 Simon Solheim, “-Vi må leggje konflikta bak oss,” NRK, January 13, 2014, 
http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/1.11467553. 
FSK MJK FSST
Strategic Direction & Intent 3.55 2.91 3.32
Goals & Objectives 3.63 2.90 3.28
Vision 3.14 2.58 2.97
Core Values 3.92 3.50 3.34
Agreement 3.35 2.92 2.64
Coordination & Integration 2.75 2.56 2.92 Highest mean score
Empowerment 4.15 3.59 4.01 Middle mean score
Team Orientation 3.90 3.71 4.08 Lowest mean score
Capability Development 4.13 3.86 4.14
Creating Change 3.45 3.37 3.56
Customer Focus 3.10 3.09 3.38






                                                 
a. Mission 
Again, Mission reflects the degree to which an organization has a clear sense of 
purpose and direction. On the index “Strategic Direction & Intent,” FS only scores higher 
than 36 percent of the organizations in the database. The lowest scoring statement in this 
index is “Our strategic direction is unclear to me.” According to the survey data, the 
strategic direction is unclear to 41 percent of FS’s employees and 18 percent are neutral, 
meaning they felt neither/nor when asked to score this statement.83  
FS scores higher than 31 percent on the index “Goals & Objectives.” The lowest 
scoring statement on this index is “There is a widespread agreement about FS’s goals.” 
29 percent disagreed and 36 percent were neutral to this statement.84    
The last index in the Mission trait is “Vision.” FS scores higher than 34 percent of 
the organizations in the database. The lowest scoring statement on this index is “we have 
a shared vision of how FS will be in the future.” 58 percent of the employees disagreed 
and 28 percent were neutral.85 
 
Figure 11.  The indexes of the Mission trait ranked  
In the survey, FFI also asked the participants to rank which index they thought 
was most important. Figure 11 shows responses from FSK and MJK. The first thing we 
83 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 10 percent strongly agrees to the statement, 31 
percent agrees, 18 percent is neutral, 33 percent disagrees and 8 percent strongly disagrees. 
84 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 2 percent strongly agrees to the statement, 33 
percent agrees, 36 percent is neutral, 22 percent disagrees and 7 percent strongly disagrees. 
85 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 2 percent strongly agrees to the statement, 13 
percent agrees, 28 percent is neutral, 32 percent disagrees and 26 percent strongly disagrees. 
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notice is that both units agree on what is the least important index, namely “Strategic 
Direction & Intent.” MJK rates “Goals & Objectives” and “Vision” as equally important. 
However, FSK rated “Vision” as the most important index and ranked “Goals & 
Objectives” as number two. If we compare these results against the circumplex report we 
find that FSK and MJK score highest on what they rank as least important (“Strategic 
Direction & Intent”). They score only thirty-four percent on the index they regard as most 
important (“Vision”).  
b. Consistency 
Consistency, as you may recall, refers to whether the organization has a system 
of values and behavior that is concise and integrated. FS scores low on both the 
“Agreement” and the “Coordination & Integration” indexes (23 and 18 percent), while on 
the “Core Values” index it scores 66. FS scores relatively high on all the statements on 
the “Core Values” index, meaning that the mean score is over 3 on all of them (1= 
strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). This does not mean that FS cannot improve on 
this index; it simply means that it is harder for us to be as specific on this as on some of 
the indexes under the Mission trait. 
The lowest scoring statement on the “Agreement” index is, “We often have 
trouble reaching agreements on key issues;” 34 percent of the employees disagree with 
the statement and 34 percent are neutral.86 
“It is easy to coordinate projects across different units in FS” is the lowest scoring 
statement on the “Coordination & Integration” index. 61 percent of the employees 
disagree and 29 percent are neutral.87 
86 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 3 percent strongly agrees to the statement, 30 
percent agrees, 34 percent is neutral, 23 percent disagrees and 11 percent strongly disagrees. 
87 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 1 percent strongly agrees to the statement, 8 percent 
agrees, 29 percent is neutral, 39 percent disagrees and 22 percent strongly disagrees. 
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Figure 12.  The indexes of the Consistency trait ranked  
The same trends we saw regarding the Mission trait are present here. What FSK 
and MJK think is least important (“Core Values”) is where they score the highest (see 
Figure 12). We also note that both FSK and MJK rank the different indexes the same 
way. 
c. Involvement 
FS’s scores are relatively high on the Involvement trait, which rates how well the 
organization empowers and engages its people. FS scores higher than 92 percent of the 
organizations on “Empowerment,” higher than 85 percent on “Team Orientation,” and 
higher than 75 percent on “Capability Development.” As a result, this is the trait where 
FS is the best according to the Denison model. All of the statements related to the 
Involvement trait have a mean score higher than 3; we can therefore say that FS needs to 
keep up the good work on this trait.  
 
Figure 13.  The indexes of the Involvement trait ranked  
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Both FSK and MJK think that team orientation is the most important index, but 
the highest score is on the least important index, namely “Empowerment” (see Figure 
13). 
d. Adaptability 
The Adaptability trait is the second best trait for FS. As we know by now, 
Adaptability is the degree to which the organization translates environmental demands 
into action and exhibits the capacity and experience to change its goals and objectives. FS 
received its single highest score for “Organizational Learning.” On this index FS scores 
higher than 94 percent of the organizations in Denison’s database.  
Interestingly, under the Adaptability trait FS also received its single lowest index 
score. FS only scores higher than 1 percent on “Customer Focus”. All but one of the 
statements concerning this index have a mean score lower than 3.88 In general, we can 
say that if FS has the goal of listening to, and acting on inputs from, the rest of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces there is considerable room for improvement. We think that the 
low score on this index also can be explained by the fact that the Denison Organizational 
Culture Survey was primarily designed for commercial businesses. Although Denison 
states that scoring high on all the four traits is similar for all organizations, we think that 
the “Customer Focus” index is one of the most “commercial.” The term “customer” is 
seldom used within NORSOF and, as a result, the participants may have a hard time 
coping with the statements on this index. Nevertheless, the index clearly indicates that FS 
is not listening to, and acting on inputs from, the rest of the Norwegian Armed Forces. 
88 Statements that scores lower than 3 are: “The Norwegian Armed Forces comments and 
recommendations often lead to change,” “Input from the Norwegian Armed Forces leadership directly 
influences our decisions,” “All members have a deep understanding of what the Norwegian Armed Forces 
wants and needs,” and “The interest of the Norwegian Armed Forces often get ignored in our decisions.” 
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Figure 14.  The indexes of the Adaptability trait ranked  
On the final index, “Creating Change,” FS scores higher than 63 percent of other 
organizations. The lowest scoring statement on this index is “Different parts of FS often 
cooperate to create change.” 50 percent disagree and 38 percent are neutral to this 
statement.89 Employees in both units agree that creating change is the most important 
index, which has the second best score (see Figure 14). 
If we shift our focus toward the four tensions that any organization must deal 
with, we find that FS scores higher on the flexible traits (Adaptability and Involvement) 
than on the stable traits (Mission and Consistency). It also scores higher on the internal 
focus traits (Involvement and Consistency) than on the external focus traits 
(Adaptability and Mission). This indicates that FS is a flexible organization that has an 
internal focus. It also indicates that FS has a low capacity to remain stable over time. The 
relatively higher diagonal score on external adaptability versus internal consistency 
indicates that the organization adapts well to the external environment. The model also 
shows that it is very much a “bottom-up” organization, something the high diagonal score 
on Involvement versus Mission indicates. 
Most of the thousands of organizations in Denison’s database are commercial 
businesses. Although Denison claims that all organizations must master the four key 
traits some of the indexes are geared more toward the commercial market. The only 
research we have found that uses the Denison Organizational Culture Survey for a SOF 
89 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 1 percent strongly agrees to the statement, 11 
percent agrees, 38 percent is neutral, 38 percent disagrees and 12 percent strongly disagrees. 
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organization is in Andy Kraag’s Master’s thesis from the Naval Postgraduate School.90 
The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (NLMAR) decided to combine its two relatively 
small SOF units into one bigger unit to fulfill the increased demand for SOF operations 
while dealing with decreasing military budgets in 2009.91 As in our thesis, Kraag uses the 
Denison model to examine how NLMARSOF can increase its overall organizational 
performance. NLMARSOF’s circumplex report is shown in Figure 15.   
 
Figure 15.  FS compared to NLMARSOF 
Comparing the two circumplex reports, FS on the left and NLMARSOF on the 
right, is interesting in and of itself. We can see that FS scores higher on most of the 
indexes. The only two indexes on which NLMARSOF has a higher score are 
“Coordination & Integration” and “Customer Focus.” However, we can see that both 
organizations score very low on “Customer Focus.” As we mentioned previously, this 
must be seen in the light of the fact that Denison’s method was originally designed for 
commercial organizations. The “Customer Focus” index is, in our opinion, the index that 
is the most “commercial.” The “customer” term is not typically used in the SOF realm 
and we think that the low score can partly be attributed to this. The results from 
90 Kraag, “Forging Netherlands Maritime Special Operations Forces.” 
91 Andy Kraag, “Combining Special Operations Forces: A Dutch Case Study,” CTX, Vol. 2, No. 3, 
2012, 5. 
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NLMARSOF could also indicate that if we had the opportunity to compare only FS’s 
results to a “Denison-military” database, FS’s score would be slightly higher. 
To summarize this section of the chapter we can say that if FS wants to increase 
its overall organizational performance it must reconcile the past, and, according to 
Denison, do the following:  
• Improve the Mission trait by: 1) making the organization’s strategic 
direction clearer, 2) attain more widespread agreement about FS’s goals, 
and 3) providing a vision about FS’s future 
• Improve the Consistency trait by: 1) handling key issues better and 2) 
better coordinating projects between the units 
• Keep up the good work regarding Involvement 
• Improve the Adaptability trait by: 1) listening to, and acting on inputs 
from the rest of the Norwegian Armed Forces, as well as 2) facilitating 
better cooperation between the units to create change.  
C. WHEN CULTURES MEET 
Though no one can go back and make a brand new start, anyone can start 
from now and make a brand new ending.92 
1. The Multi-Cultural Challenge 
Whenever there is a merger, cultures meet. A merger attempts to blend two 
cultures, without treating one or the other as dominant.93 This is where the multi-cultural 
challenge comes in: each culture is, from the viewpoint of its members, the “correct” 
culture; the way that members perceive, feel, and act on events is also the correct way to 
perceive, feel, and act.94 Research conducted on business mergers and acquisitions shows 
that between 50 and 80 percent fail in the sense that they do not achieve the predicted 
financial goals.95 A lot of research has therefore been done to try to address why this is. 
There seems to be general agreement that merger failures are due to too little attention 
having been paid to human factors and, more specifically, to the cultural challenges these 
92 Carl Bard. He was an American writer and editor, best known for his poetry. He won two Pulitzer 
Prizes, one for his poetry and another for a biography of Abraham Lincoln. 
93 Schein, The Corporate Culture Survival Guide, 189. 
94 Ibid., 189. 
95 Bang, Organisasjonskultur, 35. 
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mergers generate.96 Schein points out that these challenges are often compounded by the 
fact that the new organization does not have a shared history, and that in almost all of the 
cases one or the other subunits feels inferior, threatened, angry, or defensive.97 
After an extensive literature review, Henning Bang concludes that there are two 
primary factors that are crucial if the process of merging is to succeed:98 1) there needs to 
be cultural compatibility between the two merging organizations, and 2) the handling of 
the merging process matters. One of the problems with the process of merging is that 
culture is typically not considered in the initial phase. Instead, economic, strategic, or 
political considerations dominate.99 In most cases it is assumed that cultural issues can be 
solved once the new organization is created and is up and running. This brings us to the 
creation of FS. Are FSK and MJK compatible? And how has the process of merging been 
addressed and handled? 
a. Are FSK and MJK Compatible? 
In the previous section about “the three levels of culture” we concluded that FSK 
and MJK have many cultural similarities and that there should not, in theory, be any 
cultural hindrances between them. The purpose of this section is to look at the more 
practical aspects affecting cooperation between the two units. By analyzing the statistical 
data collected we can gain insights into what the units think of each other in terms of 
efficiency on ten specific points. We will also present data that addresses: 1) what the 
units think about working more together; 2) which agency’s requirements are the most 
important; 3) whether national or international operations are the more important; 4) the 
division of labor in terms of domain; 5) interchangeability between the two units; 6) what 
the units think about how FS is organized today; and 7) whether in the future there should 
only be one tactical unit with the same capabilities that FSK and MJK possess today. 
  
96 Ibid., 36. 
97 Schein, The Corporate Culture Survival Guide, 191. 
98 Bang, Organisasjonskultur, 36. 
99 Schein, The Corporate Culture Survival Guide, 191. 
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Unit efficiency comparison. In the survey conducted by FFI, the participants 
were asked to compare the efficiency of the two units on these ten points: 1) resource 
allocation, 2) innovation, 3) development of new tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTP), 4) group loyalty, 5) unit member satisfaction, 6) the quality of the unit’s operators, 
7) the quality of the unit’s staff/support members, 8) the readiness of the unit to conduct 
its missions, 9) overall organizational performance, and 10) quality of the selection 




Figure 16.  MJK vs. FSK viewed by both FSK and MJK 
The table above left shows how employees of FSK think FSK compares to MJK. 
Members of FSK think they are significantly more efficient on the following four points: 
readiness, overall organizational performance, the quality of their staff / support, and 
resource allocation. The Figure also shows that the majority of FSK’s employees think 
that the quality of operators in both units is the same; this is also the case for TTP 
development. We can also see that only a small portion of FSK’s employees think that 
FSK exhibits lower efficiency on some of the ten points. 
Employees of MJK think that, compared to their counterparts in FSK, they are 
significantly more efficient on five points, namely innovation, quality of the selection 
course, TTP development, quality of the operators, and resource allocation. Most in MJK 
100 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
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think that member satisfaction is the same across both units and, interestingly, they think 
that the quality of the staff / support is lower in MJK than in FSK.   
Cooperation. All the participants were also asked to complete the following 
sentence: FSK and MJK need to work together ____. Figure 17 shows how members of 
FSK and MJK responded.101 
 
Figure 17.  Cooperation between FSK and MJK 
As we can see, the majority in both units think that they should work together 
more (FSK – 81 percent, MJK – 84 percent), and only a small portion think that the units 
should work together no more or even less than they do now (FSK – 19 percent, MJK – 
16 percent).    
This is very positive for the future prospect of FS. Each unit wants, in general, to 
cooperate more with the other unit.  
Requirements. FS has many different stakeholders and both units were asked to 
rank different agencies’ requirement(s) in importance from high to low. Figure 18 depicts 
the survey results.102  
101 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
102 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
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Figure 18.  Most important requirements 
Both units agree with the fact that the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) requirements 
are most important, but they disagree on the ranking of the rest except for the Nordic 
Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) which both units put at the bottom. Members of 
FSK rank supporting the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MoJ) as second most 
important. FS is number three, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is number 
four, and their own unit (FSK) is number five.  
Members of MJK rank FS as second, their own unit as third, MoJ as fourth, and 
NATO as number five. This discrepancy makes sense in the light of the findings 
discussed in the section on the Denison circumplex report. One of the areas for 
improvement we identified is a clearer strategic direction for FS. We think that the lack 
of consensus regarding different agencies’ requirements could be fixed with 
promulgation of a clear strategic direction. 
Type of missions. On the question of which types of mission are the most 
important for FS, the two units answered the following: 82 percent of FSK members 
think that national operations are more important, the remaining 18 percent think that 
international operations are more important. In contrast, 54 percent of MJK members 
think that international operations are more important and the remaining 46 percent think 
that national operations should take precedence (see Figure 19).103 
103 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
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Figure 19.  Type of missions 
We believe this difference can likewise be explained by the low score on the 
Mission trait. If a certain priority exists within the FS leadership, it must be 
communicated to the organization. 
Division of labor – domain. One of the key issues in the many previous attempts 
to merge Norway’s SOF units, as described in Chapter Two of this thesis, has been the 
division of labor. At this point in time both units have the capabilities to work at sea and 
on land. The participants of the survey were asked what each unit should focus on. The 
results are presented in Figure 20.104  
 
Figure 20.  Division of labor – Domain 
Tellingly, 94 percent of those in FSK think that FSK members should have the 
ability to work in both domains, while 73 percent of MJK members think that FSK 
104 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
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should focus exclusively on the land domain. We can also see that 60 percent of FSK 
members think that MJK should focus on both domains, while 59 percent of MJK 
members think that MJK should focus on the maritime domain. 
Interchangeability. As far as we know there has been little interchangeability 
between the two units. What we mean by interchangeability is that you can take a person 
or a team from one of the units and place him / her / them under the control of the other 
unit. Some attempts have been made to do this. The first deployment to Afghanistan 
included members from both units and the boat squadrons from the different units have 
been organized this way multiple times on exercises in Norway. 
 
Figure 21.  Interchangeability between FSK and MJK 
As Figure 21 indicates, most people in FSK think that there should be 
interchangeability between FSK and MJK (75 percent). In MJK, 53 percent of the 
employees agree.105 
Interchangeability is a major goal for FS’s current Commanding Officer. If we 
combine the findings here with those regarding cooperation, it seems that the two units 
do take interchangeability seriously.  
105 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
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FS organization. As noted in Chapter Two, the process of establishing FS was 
not ideal. How it turned out does not match what was originally intended. This makes the 
question -Is FS optimally organized today?- especially relevant. 78 percent of those in 
FSK and 57 percent of those in MJK disagree that FS is optimally organized (see Figure 
22).106 
 
Figure 22.  Is FS optimally organized? 
Future – one unit? The CHOD’s initial intention was to merge the two tactical 
units into one. Hence, MJK was to be “acquired” by FSK. Although the new unit was to 
keep one tactical squadron at Haakonsvern Naval Base, Bergen (MJK’s Southern base in 
Norway), and one element in Ramsund (the Northern base for MJK), the bulk of the unit 
was to be moved to Rena, where the main part of FSK is today. This caused a lot of 
discord and makes the question about a future merger of the two units particularly 
interesting. The statement the survey used was: “In the future there should be one tactical 
unit with the same capabilities that FSK and MJK possesses today.” 
106 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
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Figure 23.  Future – One unit? 
The results are shown in Figure 23, and of all the questions in FFI’s survey this is 
the one where the two units diverge the most. 87 percent of FSK’s employees agree with 
the statement, while 79 percent of MJK’s employees disagree.107 
b. Merger Strategies 
According to the literature on mergers, we should address three factors when we 
look at how the FS merge is being handled:108 1) how fast do employees create a “new” 
organizational culture, and let go of the phrase “us and them,” 2) how just do employees 
think the process has been, and 3) how well has the organization managed to 
communicate before, during, and after the merger. These three factors highlight 
something that is very important if the goal is to form a workable union: namely, has the 
organization applied an appropriate merger strategy? 
Ali R. Malekazedeh and Afsaneh Nahavandi suggest that there are four distinct 
strategies for merging different organizational cultures.109 These four strategies are: 1) 
assimilation, 2) deculturation, 3) integration, and 4) separation (see Table 2). 
 
107 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
108 Bang, Organisasjonskultur, 37. 
109 Ali. R. Malekazedeh and Afsaneh Nahavandi, “Making Mergers Work by Managing Cultures,” 
Journal of Business Strategy, May-June 1990, 55–57. 
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Table 2.   Merger strategies 
Assimilation occurs when employees at the acquired organization willingly 
embrace the cultural values of the acquiring organization. This strategy works best if the 
acquired organization has a weak, dysfunctional culture whereas the acquiring 
organization is strong and is aligned well with its surroundings.110 
Deculturation. Most assimilation strategies do not work because the employees 
resist organizational change, particularly when they are asked to throw away personal and 
cultural values.111 Some acquiring organizations try to apply a deculturation strategy 
under these conditions. They try to impose their culture on the acquired organization by 
visible “force” as they strip away the artifacts and reward systems that support the old 
culture. People who cannot or will not adapt are often forced out of the organization. This 
strategy will only work if the acquired organization's culture does not work and the 
employees do not realize it.  
Integration is achieved by taking the best of each culture and combining it into a 
new culture. This takes time and can be risky because there are many forces that will try 
to preserve the old cultures.112 Integration works best if the existing cultures can be 
improved and if they are compatible. 
110 Malekazedeh and Nahavandi, “Making Mergers Work by Managing Cultures,” 56. 
111 Ibid., 56. 
112 Malekazedeh and Nahavandi, “Making Mergers Work by Managing Cultures,” 56. 
Merger Strategy Description Works best when: 
Assimilation Acquired organization embraces 
acquiring organization’s culture 
Acquired organization has a weak 
culture 
Deculturation Acquired organization imposes its 
culture on unwilling acquired 
organization 
Rarely works – may be necessary 
only when acquired organization’s 
culture does not work but 
employees do not realize it 
Integration Combining two or more cultures 
into a new composite culture 
Existing cultures can be improved 
Separation Merging organizations remain 
distinct entities with minimal 
exchange of culture or 
organizational practices 
Entities work in different 




                                                 
The separation strategy is all about preserving the two old cultures by keeping 
two distinct entities within the broader organization.113 This strategy works best if the 
two entities work in different environments and therefore need different cultures.  
In Chapter II we mentioned the controversy that arose when the future 
organizational design of NORSOF became known in 2012–2013. The CHOD’s initial 
plan of letting MJK be “acquired” by FSK was not received well by MJK’s employees. 
Most felt that they had been left out of the process and thought that the process was 
unjust. We think it is fair to say that many in MJK felt that with the CHOD’s merger 
strategy, MJK would cease to exist and its members were to be transferred to FSK. As we 
have previously noted, MJK’s culture is very strong and we think therefore that an 
assimilation strategy would not have worked. 
As RADM Nils Johan Holte underscored in his speech in Oslo on March 31, 
2014, both FSK and MJK will continue to cultivate close relations with the two armed 
services from which each originated. This may indicate that for now a separation strategy 
has been selected, and that the two units’ cultures will live side by side within FS, at least 
in the near term. 
Looking further ahead and based on the research conducted for this thesis, we 
believe that the preferred strategy for FS should be integration. We are well aware that 
this process will take time, but if FS can take the best of FSK and the best of MJK the 
result will eventually be better than if the two cultures “live” side by side.   
To summarize this chapter on organizational culture: we began by defining 
organizational culture and highlighted the importance of paying attention to this in 
mergers. FS’s culture is comprised of the cultures of FSK and MJK. We found that both 
cultures are functional and that they both are very strong. We also found numerous 
similarities between the two, enough that there should not be any cultural hindrances 
between the two units.  
We then presented our analysis of FFI’s survey data in light of the Denison 
model. The circumplex report illustrates where FS is today in terms of its culture, and it 
113 Ibid., 56. 
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highlights where FS must improve if it wants to increase its overall organizational 
performance. We also highlighted that FS must reconcile the past before it can move 
forward. In the final portion of the chapter we looked at more practical matters regarding 
the merger. We found that the FSKs and MJKs cultures are compatible on all issues 
except for the idea of a future merger of the two tactical units. This led us to our 
conclusion that the preferred merger strategy for FS should be integration, hence taking 
the best of both FSK and MJK to create FS’s eventual organizational culture.  
We have, in other words, tried to describe where FS is today and where it must go 
if it wants to increase its overall organizational performance. How it is going to get there 
is the theme of the next chapter, which is about the importance of leadership. 
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IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF LEADERSHIP  
The only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage 
culture. If you do not manage culture, it manages you, and you may not 
even be aware of the extent to which this is happening.114 
 
To look more deeply into the importance of, and interconnectivity between, 
culture and leadership we have divided this chapter into three sections: why leadership is 
important, how leadership should be executed, and, finally, what leadership tools should 
be emphasized. This division is inspired by Simon Sinek and his book, Start With 
Why.115 Sinek’s cognitive approach will set the baseline for our arguments. We will 
further draw on supporting literature about leadership, as well as our own NORSOF 
experience. 
Sinek uses the analogy of the Golden Circle116 to emphasize the importance of 
working from the inside out. It all starts with the nucleus, the why. Consequently, he 
would argue that it is not sufficient to acknowledge the importance of leadership when it 
comes to forging the Norwegian Special Forces: you first have to appreciate why 
leadership is important. Any fuzziness about this will hamper the approach for how 
leadership should be executed and what tools should be emphasized.117  
 
114 Edgar H. Schein. 
http://www.sequent.biz/UserUploads/Consulting%20Services/Cultural_Assessment_SS_05-16-10.pdf, 
accessed January 2014. 
115 Simon Sinek, Start With Why (England, London: Penguin Group, 2009).  
116 Ibid., 37–39. 
117 Our analysis of why leadership is important, how leadership should be executed, and what 
leadership tools should be emphasized is derived from Edgar H. Schein’s book, Organizational Culture 
and Leadership, part 3–5. 
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A. WHY LEADERSHIP IS IMPORTANT 
For those who have an open mind for new ideas, who seek to create long-
lasting success and who believe that success requires the aid of others, I 
offer you a challenge. From now on, start with [why].118  
Leadership begins the culture creation process, and is also responsible for 
changing culture. Leadership plays an initiating role; leadership at every level articulates 
the rules of social order and the way we interact in the organization. Leadership initiates 
how to bring a group of people together for some purpose. This “burden” requires that 
leaders know what we should do. Even if we assume that the Norwegian Special 
Operation Forces have a relatively non-hierarchical structure, leaders are looked up to for 
approval of their subordinates’ actions.  
Leaders will, in general, be viewed as founders. Hence, they play a significant 
role in shaping the environment. It is critical for leaders to be good examples: their 
personal manner of setting an example and their influence emits the culture of their 
organization.119  
The leadership’s impact on organizational culture in general, and in our case in 
the forging of Norwegian Special Forces, is not a process that should be left to accidental 
or spontaneous efforts. FS is a Command that has been recently established and it is fair 
to say that the leadership will be vitally important in defining, and resolving, external 
adaptation and internal integration challenges alike. Some of these external and internal 
challenges can be identified through the analysis of FFI’s survey findings. FS is, as 
mentioned, a new Command, but its elements are mature. The two tactical units, FSK and 
MJK, each have a long history and their members’ and leaders’ assumptions about beliefs 
and values, is important to recognize. Leadership in both units and in FSST will 
determine how to operate internally and externally. Organizational change resulting in 
creation of new group processes is unavoidable; this, in and of itself, makes leadership 
execution at all levels tremendously important.  
118 Sinek, Start With Why, 7. 
119 Erik Bertrand Larssen, “Mentalisten” [The Mentalist], Ledernytt, February 15, 2014, 
http://www.ledernytt.no/mentalisten.5419575-112372.html, accessed February 18, 2014. 
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1. Findings 
 The importance of leaders who “practice what they preach” is especially 
significant for the way ahead. The majority (73%) of survey respondents indicate that 
leaders in FS right now possess congruence between what they preach and what they 
practice. To a lesser degree (49%), respondents indicate that the leadership they see is 
consistent across the organization. Survey results indicate that members strongly believe 
that their leaders are very good, as a whole, but the collective leadership does not yet 
seem to think or act as one (see Figure 24).  120 
 
Figure 24.  Leaders as role models and distinctive leadership in FS 
Figures 25 and 26 depict further some of the issues related to the importance of 
leadership when it comes to identifying and steering a course for change. Vision, 
articulated in goals and objectives, is important for managing and changing/adjusting 
culture. The findings suggest two things: (1) respondents have a generally positive view, 
but (2) quite a few, and arguably too many, chose the “neutral alternative,” which 
suggests that they do not care, or do not know, or are unsure.121   
120 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
121 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
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Figure 25.  Leaders setting and articulating goals/objectives in FS  
 
 
Figure 26.  Leaders and vision in FS 
The general “indifference” inferred from the respondents’ choices also points to a 
discrepancy between FSK and MJK. This will not be elaborated on here, but it is worth 
noting that only 20% in MJK agree that the leadership “has gone on record” about the 
objectives FS is trying to achieve (compared to 71% in FSK) and only 22% in MJK 
believe that the FS leadership is engaged in long-term thinking (compared to 69% in 
FSK). We believe it is difficult to be accurate in speculating about the discrepancies 
between FSK and MJK for the following reasons: 
• The survey questions were intended to ask about the leadership in FS as a 
whole, not in the respective units: FSK and MJK. Since FS is a newly 
established joint command, the survey respondents might have answered 
about leadership based on their experience from their “own” units.  
• If, de facto, the discrepancy is as indicated, then there is a difference 
between FSK and MJK, but we do not have clear evidence of this and we 
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do not have data to corroborate this inference. Nor do we have conclusive 
data.  
• Any speculation by us will be too subjective.      
B. HOW LEADERSHIP SHOULD BE EXECUTED 
The best executive is the one who has sense enough to pick good men to do 
what he wants done, and self-restraint enough to keep from meddling with 
them while they do it.122 
The literature on leadership is immense. One estimate is that there exist over 
6,000 theories of leadership and it is claimed that while leadership is the most studied 
field, it is also the least understood. For instance, one study from 2008 revealed over 220 
different definitions of leadership.123 How leadership should be executed is a vast and 
somewhat open question. There might not be a right or wrong answer, and it is fair to say 
that the answer should depend on the situation. Nevertheless, it is important for leaders to 
set the tone, communicate, and embody a philosophy that is applicable for ends they 
define according to the needs of the scenario. To achieve unity and increased efficiency 
requires a good leader-follower relationship, especially since unleashing the full potential 
in others is the only way to achieve sustainable collective efficiency. 
History offers many examples of great military leaders who excelled in the realms 
of both conventional and irregular warfare. Leadership in an organizational and/or 
cultural context might differ from tactical combat command leadership. But even taking 
into consideration all the diverse situations that leaders might face, it should still be 
possible to suggest how leadership should be executed when it comes to forging the 
Norwegian Special Operation Forces. Our suggestions do not diverge from official 
doctrine. Nor are they controversial, in our mind. They instead represent a continuation of 
adaptive leadership theories. Again, borrowing from Schein:124 (1) leaders must 
understand the organizational culture in order to detect potential incompatibilities; (2) 
122 Theodore Roosevelt. http://thoughts.forbes.com/thoughts/executives-theodore-roosevelt-the-best-
executive, accessed December, 2013. 
123 Åge Johansen and Stig Lunde, “Ledelsesidealer i Forsvaret” [Leadership Ideals in the Norwegian 
Armed Forces], Econas Tidsskrift for økonomi og ledelse, January 2011, 40–49. 
124 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 377–379. 
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leaders must be able to decipher and reveal their and others’ assumptions; (3) leaders 
must be able to communicate potential synergies and incompatibilities in such a way that 
they make themselves understood by others; and (4) potential cultural issues must be 
taken seriously.  
1. Mission Command  
Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will 
surprise you with their ingenuity.125 
Patton’s encapsulation of Mission Command is referenced at the very beginning 
of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ Fundamental View on Leadership.126 The document 
acknowledges the transition from detailed, order-based leadership that aims to avoid 
uncertainty, to a form of leadership that considers uncertainty as a central element. The 
Mission Command philosophy represents a concrete expression of this. Nevertheless, the 
Armed Forces retain their deep roots in the traditional authoritarian military leadership 
style, even while acknowledging the importance of Mission Command. This co-existence 
of two seemingly divergent leadership philosophies is significant and needs to be 
recognized. 
Military leaders face different challenges at the strategic level than at the tactical 
level; awareness of the contextual situation makes a distinction between the two (though 
they are not mutually exclusive). Given the level at which FS operates, the emphasis in 
this thesis has been on other than tactical leadership. Hence the focus on Mission 
Command and its constituent tenets: Communication, Commitment, and Trust (which 
will be described in more detail in sub-section C).   
a. Findings 
Decision making at the lowest possible level, delegating authority, personal 
empowerment, and disciplined initiative and risk-taking are clearly traits that are in play 
125 George S. Patton. http://www.generalpatton.com/quotes/index3.html, accessed December 2013. 
126 Norwegian Armed Forces`, Forsvarets grunnsyn på ledelse [Norwegian Armed Forces’ 
Fundamental View on Leadership],Oslo: Norwegian Armed Forces, May 2012).  
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in FS. Significantly, few respondents disagreed with these characteristics as can be seen 
in Figure 27.127  
  
Figure 27.  Measured Mission Command in FS 
In our analysis/opinion this suggests that personnel at lower levels in FS have 
truly been placed in a strong position and act on the leadership delegated to them. But, it 
is interesting to note that, at the same time, there is lower confidence in the leadership’s 
ability to convey objectives and clearly convey a long-term viewpoint (as seen in Figures 
24 and 25). The “strong position” of personnel at lower levels is also truer of FSK than 
MJK, according to respondents. We see the same tendency here as in the results on the 
importance of leadership: only 52% of personnel in MJK agree that decisions are usually 
made at the level where the best information is available (vs. 86% in FSK), and only 56% 
of the personnel in MJK agree that authority is delegated so people can act on their own 
(vs. 81% in FSK).  
127 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
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2. Soft Leadership 
Treat a man as he is and he will remain as he is. Treat a man as he can 
and should be and he will become as he can and should be.128 
Professor M.S. Rao coins the term “soft leadership” in his book, Soft 
Leadership—Make Others Feel More Important.129 He intends his book as an endeavor 
to explore soft leadership as a new style of leadership. Yet, he refers to Mahatma Gandhi 
as the prime example of a leader who truly articulated and embodied this kind of 
leadership, suggesting that there is nothing new under the sun. Although the Bass 
Handbook of Leadership does not directly include the concept of soft leadership, it 
nonetheless pre-dates Rao’s book and depicts concepts and models that are similar: most 
notably in the realm of relation-oriented leadership styles.130 
We believe outstanding leadership manifests itself primarily among a leader’s 
followers, and the notion of a cohesive team is significant. Soft leadership has much in 
common with democratic, charismatic, transformational, and servant leadership styles 
and relies on emotional intelligence. Soft leadership is, basically, a people-oriented 
approach; the people are the precious human resource, and they constitute the social 
capital. A soft touch with people should not, meanwhile, diminish the demand for a real 
touch when it comes to combat missions, as well as the need for dedication and 
discipline. 
Leadership is responsible for creating an environment where people really do 
matter. At the same time, leadership that facilitates care-taking within the organization 
will not fail. As many have noted, leadership is equal parts art and science; if it were all 
science, wars would be much more predictably fought. Soft leadership requires the right 
mindset, skill set, and toolset. 
128 Johann von Goethe. http://www.aquotes.net/johann-von-goethe/johann-von-goethe-treat-a-man-as-
he-is-and-he-will-remain-as-he-is, accessed December 2013. 
129 M. S. Roa, Soft Leadership – Make Others Feel More Important (New Delhi: Galgotia 
Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2011). 
130 Bernard M. Bass, The Bass Handbook of Leadership, 4th Edition (New York: Free Press, 2008). 
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When it comes to the leadership’s role in unifying and improving organizational 
efficiency for the Norwegian Special Operation Forces, it is vital to make use of the 
softer sides of leadership in order to be able to influence people by providing purpose, 
direction, and motivation while also operating to accomplish the mission and improving 
the future organization. Leaders, who unleash the best in people, end up with people who, 
in return, make those at the top look like geniuses. Leaders and organizations that can 
best accomplish the difficult task of organizing and motivating the human element should 
excel.    
3. Team Orientation 
The bottom line is, when people are crystal clear about the most important 
priorities of the organization and team they work with and prioritize their 
work around those top priorities, not only are they many times more 
productive, they discover they have the time they need to have a whole 
life.131 
The importance of team orientation in Special Operation Forces should be beyond 
dispute. Teamwork, in its essence, means you have the temperament for and take pleasure 
in working in teams. A team consists of a group of people who share the same goals and 
work together to achieve those goals. Teams in SOF share many of the characteristics 
with other teams in different contexts. But military teams in general, and Special 
Operation teams in particular, differ when it comes to the combat environment in which 
they operate, a context characterized by its life-and-death nature, high level of uncertainty 
and complexity, and long-term consequences of decisions made and actions taken. 
Effective teamwork is a critical factor to mission success.132 Team orientation should not 
be limited to combat; a mission extends far beyond the execution of H-hour.133 All SOF 
missions involve both preparation and post-action analysis. This is one reason team 
orientation is important even for SOF units’ daily routines.    
131 Stephen Covey. http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/s/stephencov450802.html, accessed 
December 2013. 
132 Eduardo Salas, Team Effectiveness in Complex Organizations (New York: Taylor & Francis 
Group, LLC, 2009), 293 
133 The time of day at which an attack, landing, or other military operation is scheduled to begin. 
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a. Findings 
As Figure 28 indicates, (1) FS is strongly oriented around team constellations, but 
(2) the team orientation is weak in the newly established FS itself.134 This suggests that 
the different sub-units, historically, are independently oriented around teams. At the same 
time, the new “team,” FS, has not yet gained momentum as a team. Why it has not cannot 
be explained from the figures below. Still it is important to recognize the fact that teams 
are the predominant constellation in both FSK and MJK, and there is skepticism in both 
when it comes to unbiased team orientation in FS today. 
 
Figure 28.  Measured Team Orientation in FS 
134 The source of data is the data collected by FFI. 
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It takes time to build a team and establish team cohesion in FS and it might be the 
most significant task for the joint leadership as it forges a 21st century Norwegian Special 
Operation Forces. Worth noting is that there are no significant discrepancies between 
FSK and MJK in this regard. Both tactical units emphasize team orientation to the same 
strong extent and both are equally skeptical when it comes to the current team orientation 
within FS as a whole.   
If those who fall under the new FS construct believe, as suggested by the findings 
of the FFI survey, that teams comprise the fundamental building blocks for the entire 
organization then it is imperative that this holds for the entire organization and not just 
for some selected portions of it. It is also important that teams operate jointly with other 
teams and as a force multiplier for the greater organizational domain of FS. Teams rely 
on communication, commitment, and trust. These tenets cannot be restricted to specific 
teams, but must be adhered to by and for the entire organization.               
C. WHICH LEADERSHIP TOOLS SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED 
My own definition of leadership is this: The capacity and the will to rally 
men and women to a common purpose and the character which inspires 
confidence.135 
Involvement and participation is needed to diagnose what is going on and to 
figure out what to do. Therefore, we propose a triangle of three significant leadership 
tools that should be emphasized: commitment, communication, and trust (CCT). We 
believe that communication should be the way, commitment should be the means, and 
trust should be the end.  
We sorted out a question pool from the 60 questions derived from the Denison 
questionnaire to measure these three dimensions: Communication (thirteen questions), 
Commitment (nine questions), and Trust (six questions). Each of these pools was tested 
for internal consistency by using Chronbach’s Alpha formula and they were compared to 
each other to discern their rank order of importance.136 
135 Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. 
http://www.leadershipnow.com/characterquotes.html, accessed December 2013. 
136 For further details and denotations see: http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/spss/faq/alpha.html. 
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Table 3.   Descriptive statistics: Consistency testing and scoring of compiled 
questions regarding CCT   
Using Chronbach’s Alpha, each pool yielded a reliability coefficient >.70, which 
serves as “acceptable” evidence that the questions measure an underlying (or latent) 
construct (see Table 3). When scoring the three dimensions, Communication came out 
with the lowest score. In addition to our contention that Communication is the way, its 
relatively low score suggests that Communication is the dimension with the greatest 
potential for improvement. Despite the fact that the scores for Commitment and Trust are 
not as high as they could or should be (≤ 69%), they are not as low as Communication 
which is why we will concentrate on Communication more.       
1. Communication 
The major mistake in communication is to believe that it happens.137 
“Communication” comes from the Latin communis, which means common. When 
we are communicating we are trying to establish a “commonness” with someone.138 
Communication refers to far more than sharing information; it involves sharing ideas and 
an attitude. In the same way that a military unit is not stronger, or more efficient, than its 
137 George Bernard Shaw. http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/George_Bernard_Shaw, accessed December 
2013. 
138 Wilbur Schramm, “How Communication Works” in 53rd Yearbook of the National Society for the 
Study of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
Trust Commitment Communication
Mean 20,60 30,77 39,99
Median 21,00 31,00 40,00
Mode 22,00 32,00 39,00
Range 17,00 25,00 41,00
Minimum 11,00 17,00 20,00
Maximum 28,00 42,00 61,00
Standard Deviation 3,50 4,51 7,24
Variance 4,96 6,72 13,03
Cronbach's Alpha 0,71 0,75 0,81
Number of respondents Classified Classified Classified
Number of questions 6 9 13
Score 69 % 68 % 62 %
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weakest link, the same can be said of a “communication society.” If the intended 
recipient(s) of the information do not receive adequate or clear information; if the 
message is not decoded fully; if messages are not transmitted quickly and accurately 
enough; if the message is not decoded in a pattern that corresponds to the encoding; and 
finally, if the destination is unable to handle the decoded message so as to produce the 
desired response—then, obviously, the system is working at less than top efficiency.139  
Communication is a system, and does not just involve spoken or written language. 
The best way to communicate values and common bonds in FS is through behavior. 
Personnel need to be in tune; they need to stay in touch; there needs to be trust; there 
need to be commitments to a common set of conventions, to a shared culture. In forging 
FS, and in expanding the culture so that it builds on pre-existing history, it is critical to 
pass along values to new members and, at the same time and given new contexts, 
reaffirm those values to old hands.140 This, as Schein points out, is one key to an 
organization that thrives over time. 
Indeed, communication might be the most important skill to master in order to 
achieve meaningful work and fulfilling relationships. It is the only smooth way to achieve 
desired ends. Otherwise, when good communication is lacking and signals are crossed, 
this can lead to dysfunction on and off a team.141 Veiled discussions and guarded 
comments hamper the development of commitment and trust. Instead, the way should be 
paved with straight talk142 and one should encounter only factual communication.   
Again, communication involves more than just “delivering words.” It is generally 
believed that communication consists of what we say (words), how we say it (tone), and 
how we act (body language). Action alludes to both imminence (action when words are 
spoken) and to the action that follows (consistency between spoken words and future 
action). It is important to be congruent when communicating and it is important to 
appreciate the magnitude of communication as a system—consisting of more than mere 
139 Wilbur Schramm, “How Communication Works,” III-I-2. 
140 Max DePree, Leadership is an Art (New York: Dell Publishing, 1989), 101–108. 
141 Patrick Lencioni, The Five Dysfunctions of a Team (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 188. 
142 Stephen M. R. Covey, The Speed of Trust (New York: Free Press, 2006), 136. 
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words. Thus, it is imperative that FS take responsibility for any failure to communicate 
effectively. The audience cannot be blamed for poor communication; it is the FS 
leadership’s responsibility to communicate clearly. In addition, messages need to be 
acted upon in a consistent and believable way, so that words and deeds are congruent. 
a. Findings 
Figure 29 depicts the result of compiling the thirteen questions regarding 
Communication. These questions were picked from the original 60 in Denison’s 
questionnaire at our discretion.  We modified the original choice from “Strongly Agree, 
Agree, Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree” to “Agree, Neutral, and Disagree.” The 
immediate takeaway from the figure is that there is a discrepancy between FSK and MJK: 
in general, MJK possesses significantly less confidence that there is good communication 
in FS. In addition, one out of three in FS as a whole disagrees or strongly disagrees that 
there is good communication in the organization, while another third “have no opinion.”  
 
Figure 29.  Measured Communication in FS 
Both FSK and MJK are units that have very diverse personnel when it comes to 
age, employee status, selection undergone, and experience. We considered the possibility 
that Communication differed significantly among some of these demographics. Two 
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demographics were looked into and frequency analyses were conducted for officers and 
NCOs for both FSK and MJK. 
 
Table 4.   Communication in FS, shown with two demographics in respectively FSK 
and MJK, in reference to figure above 
The findings in Table 4 suggest that officers disagree more than NCOs that there 
is good communication in FS. The reason cannot be deduced from the table. But, given 
that officers have served longer than NCOs and are typically in leadership positions, it 
seems significant that they disagree a great deal more with the claim that there is good 
communication in FS. 
In the search to find quantitative answers to what should be communicated and to 
whom, we performed a multiple regression analysis. The regression analysis attempts to 
determine the strength of the relationship between Communication as the dependent 
variable (denoted by y) and a series of other changing independent variables (denoted 
x’s). Our thirteen Communication questions were lumped into one single y. In order to 
properly select the independent variables (x’s) we started off with the Denison model as a 
whole. Within the four traits in the model (Mission, Adaptability, Involvement, and 
Consistency), the respondents were asked to prioritize, hence their answer would point to 
the most important element within the respective traits they regarded as most important 
for the forging of Norwegian Special Operation Forces. The following emerged: 
• The aspect of  “Vision” within the Mission trait  
• The dimension of “Creating Change” within the Adaptability trait 
• The characteristic of “Team Orientation” within the Involvement trait 
• The factor of “Coordination & Integration” within the Consistency trait      
 
Officers NCO Officers NCO
Disagree 31 % 16 % 42 % 31 %
Neutral 24 % 33 % 34 % 43 %
Agree 46 % 51 % 24 % 27 %
FSK MJK
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A separate regression analysis was conducted for Communication and each 
prioritized element within the respective four traits (four regression analyses). Questions 
that were used in the “lumping” to create the y (Communication) were eliminated when 
creating the x’s. This was done to reduce multicollinearity and avoid using the same 
question both as the dependent and independent variable. All demographics were used in 
the analysis. For the first step of the analysis, we eliminated those independent variables 
that had P-value > .5. Secondly, we eliminated the independent variables one by one until 
the remaining independent variables met the criteria of P-value < .05. In addition, the 
Significance-F value was acceptably low. 
After the respective regression analyses were conducted, the two demographics 
and ten questions that met the criteria were kept and used in a new regression analysis. 
After doing multiple regression analyses, we ended up with no demographics and six 
questions as the independent variables that explained the variance in the dependent 
variable (Communication). The Significance-F value was acceptably low (1.1E-35) and 
all P-values >.05. R2 returned with a value of .64, meaning that the majority (64%) of 
challenges within Communication can be explained by the chosen six independent 
variables.  
From the analysis, we can deduce that the following is imperative to 
communicate, in ranked order: 
• The vision for FS needs to be articulated in a way that is understandable 
for all employees and in a way that makes it recognizable and tangible 
enough to create a sense of commitment and create an understandable 
framework for contribution. 
• The goals for FS need to be articulated in a way that is understandable for 
all employees and in a way that it is recognizable and tangible enough to 
create commitment and a feeling of contribution. 
• The way FS works has to be consistent and predictable. This does not 
mean that FS has to be “conventional,” but it means that the units within 
FS need to feel that they will be heard, that they are important, and that 
they will be involved in decision making and can trust their superiors. It 
also means that there will be no room for biases or discrimination between 
units. 
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• FS needs to be innovative. New and better ways to work need to be 
implemented incrementally. Innovation needs to be encouraged, 
appreciated, and accepted regardless of individuals’ unit affiliation. 
• FS needs to encourage cooperation. The cooperation needs to be unbiased 
and should primarily be directed toward cooperation between the 
respective units in FS. 
• Short-term solutions cannot impede FS’s long-term-strategy. 
The regression analysis eliminated all demographics. This suggests that there is 
no correlation, or a statistically insignificant correlation, between unit affiliation, age, 
employee status etc. and Communication as a dependent variable. Nevertheless, we note 
that Figure 29 and Table 4 suggest a discrepancy in opinion exists between FSK and 
MJK when it comes to the question of whether there is good communication in FS. Given 
the findings depicted in Figure 29 along with the regression analysis it might be fair to 
state that the recommendation about Communication noted above needs to be 
communicated clearly to: 
• Personnel in FS as a whole, with a 
• Special emphasis on personnel affiliated with MJK, and a 
• Special emphasis on officers in both FSK and MJK    
 
2. Commitment 
It is not who is right and wrong but what is right and wrong matters while 
resolving conflicts.143 
Commitment can be examined through a variety of facets, centering on the 
individual or the group. When it comes to groups, it is important to distinguish 
commitment from cohesion. For instance, one can be committed, and cohesive, around a 
task, but also when it comes to relations. For the purpose of this thesis it is important to 
note that commitment does not equate to obedience or conformity, both of which can lead 
to cohesion that is too strong, resulting in such things as groupthink, anchoring, social 
proof, or deduction which foster biases and other cognitive traps. At the same time, we do 
143 Professor M.S. Rao, Soft Leadership – Make Others Feel More Important, 63 
 71 
                                                 
not believe commitment that is too strong is sufficient to hamper efficiency or the quality 
of performance.  
Commitment can be achieved in two ways: (1) commitment to the leadership and 
its significance, and (2) commitment to the tasks and constellations of relations, both 
imminent and for the future. A similar two-sided formulation of commitment is also 
found in William H. McRaven’s theory of special operations.144 Commitment falls under 
his principle of purpose. We believe it is accurate to say that McRaven’s principle of 
purpose is the only one of his six principles (Simplicity, Security, Repetition, Surprise, 
Speed, and Purpose) which can be utilized from the tactical to the strategic level when it 
comes to influencing success of future tasks.145  
Another way to think about commitment is as a function of two things: clarity and 
buy-in.146 Simply put, clarity results from good communication and buy-in tells us that 
commitment is far more than a word: it is an act.147 This suggests that, in its forging 
process, FS needs to pay attention to key aspects of its constituent units’ histories and 
give their members the opportunity to share opinions and perspectives. By tapping into 
the collective wisdom of the entire group, the organization can begin to confidently 
commit to the unifying process of gaining organizational efficiency. The significance of 
commitment, absolutely applicable to FS, is neatly described by the following: 
When an executive team fails to achieve [commitment] from all team 
members, even if the discrepancies that exist seem relatively small, 
employees who report to those executives will inevitably clash when they 
try to interpret marching orders that are not clearly aligned with those of 
colleagues in other departments. Like a vortex, small gaps between 
executives high up in an organization become major discrepancies by the 
time they reach employees below.148     
144 William H. McRaven, SPEC OPS – Case Study in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and 
Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 21–23 
145 Geir Egil Kalkvik, “Intensjonsformidling – nøkkelen til militære spesialoperasjoners suksess?” 
[Purpose – The Key to Success in Special Operations?] (Thesis, University in Bergen, Norway, 2006).  
146 Lencioni, The Five Dysfunctions of a Team, 207–212. 
147 Jean-Paul Sartre. http://philosiblog.com/2012/06/21/commitment-is-an-act-not-a-word, accessed 
December 2013 
148 Lencioni, The Five Dysfunctions of a Team, 209. 
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a. Findings 
Figure 30 depicts the result of a compilation of the nine questions regarding 
commitment. The questions measured were picked from the original 60 from Denison’s 
questionnaire at our discretion. As before, we simplified from the five categories of 
“Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree” to the three shown in 
the figure. The immediate takeaway from the figure is the discrepancy that lies between 
FSK and MJK: in general, MJK signals significantly less confidence that there is 
commitment in FS.  
 
Figure 30.  Measured Commitment in FS 
As before, we looked into the possibility that Commitment depended on the 
employee status in both FSK and MJK:  
    
Table 5.   Commitment in FS, shown with two demographics in respectively FSK 
and MJK, in reference to Figure above 
Officers NCO Officers NCO
Disagree 23 % 10 % 29 % 19 %
Neutral 27 % 31 % 39 % 45 %
Agree 50 % 60 % 32 % 36 %
FSK MJK
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Again, the findings suggest that officers disagree more than NCOs regarding the 
notion that there is commitment in FS (see Table 5).  
3. Trust 
[Your Men], when rightly and fully trusted, will return the trust.149 
According to Stephen M. R. Covey, trust consists of two parts: character and 
competence.150 Trust is not a stand-alone trait; it depends on, and is a prerequisite for, 
communication (the way) and commitment (the means). Trust must be earned and it must 
be extended to others. Trust is like an aquifer; it is the foundation and the feeder for 
efficiency and it ensures that there are no hidden agendas, personal agendas, interpersonal 
conflicts, rivalries, or defensive and protective communication.  
Trust, meaning confidence, is crucial to FS’ forging process. FS needs to establish 
trust in all five waves described by Covey151:  
(1) Each member must trust himself, and his ability to set and achieve goals and 
to keep commitments.  
(2) Commitment is best achieved through consistent behavior and requires acts, 
not only words. It is vital to establish trust with others in a relation-oriented leadership 
domain.  
(3) Members being able to place trust in the newly established FS is key. 
Members need to be aligned with the forging process when it comes to structures, 
systems, and innovation to ensure enhanced organizational efficiency.  
(4) Reputation is important for FS. Norwegian Special Operation Forces’ most 
turbulent year cannot be allowed to taint the future. FS’s brand must be articulated and 
trusted by the society it serves and the decision makers for whom it provides capabilities.  
149 Abraham Lincoln. http://www.inspirationalstories.com/quotes/abraham-lincoln-the-people-when-
rightly-and-fully-trusted, accessed December 2013. 
150 Covey, The Speed of Trust, 30. 
151 Ibid., 34–35. 
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(5) Reputation matters. A sufficiently open organization, that demonstrates 
respect for operational security, will earn the trust of its constituencies. In return, FS will 
be trusted for both its organizational character and competence and its members’ 
character and competence.  
Trust lies at the heart of a functioning, cohesive team. Fundamental to smooth 
functioning is being willing to be open and honest without worrying that what you say 
can be used against you. As previously described, a soft leadership domain fosters a 
positive atmosphere in which people will speak their minds without concerns about the 
need for self-protection. As a result, the organization can focus its energy and attention 
on mission-related issues rather than being caught up in cognitive traps.152 The costs can 
be inordinate; too much time will end up being wasted on managing behaviors and 
interactions within the organization. This inward approach vs. an outward one is nicely 
depicted in the book Leaders Eat Last by Simon Sinek.153 He labels this the circle of 
safety, and references Aesop from the sixth century B.C.: 
A lion used to prowl about a field in which Four Oxen used to dwell. 
Many times he tried to attack them; but whenever he came near they 
turned their tails to one another, so that whichever way he approached 
them he was met by the horns of one of them. At last, however, they fell a-
quarreling among themselves, and each went off to pasture alone in a 
separate corner of the field. Then the Lion attacked one by one and soon 
made an end of all four.       
Establishing, maintaining, and improving the circle of safety can yield striking 
results for an organization. The feeling of belonging, straightforward communication, and 
commitment to a task all enhance trust, cooperation, and problem solving. Trust within 
the organization sets a culture free from internal rifts so that it can concentrate on its 
mission. If members in FS have to contend with dangers from within, in addition to those 
found in the 21st century battlespace, they will become less able to accomplish the 
missions assigned them. This would negate the effort made to strive for organizational 
efficiency through the forging process.   
152 Zachary Shore, Blunder – Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions (New York: Bloomsbury, 2008) 
153 Simon Sinek, Leaders Eat Last (New York: Penguin Group, 2014), 20. 
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a. Findings 
 
Figure 31.  Measured Trust in FS 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Figure 31 depicts results similar to those found for 
Communication and Commitment.  
 
Table 6.   Trust in FS, shown with two demographics in FSK and MJK respectively, 
in reference to Figure above 
We applied the same methods as for Communication and Commitment. Yet, in 
this case what we see is a smaller discrepancy between officers and NCOs in both FSK 
and MJK (see Table 6). But still, there is a difference in responses between FSK and 
MJK. MJK members have less confidence that there is sufficient trust in FS, and (as 
before) officers are less confident than NCOs. 
 
Officers NCO Officers NCO
Disagree 16 % 8 % 24 % 19 %
Neutral 16 % 26 % 35 % 35 %
Agree 68 % 66 % 41 % 45 %
FSK MJK
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STUDIES 
A merger is hard to pull off under any circumstances. It's harder when 
everybody is against you.154 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to assist the newly established command, 
Forsvarets Spesialstyrker (FS), in its forging process. FS consists of an overarching joint 
staff, Forsvarets Spesialstyrker Stab (FSST), and the two Norwegian Special Operations 
commands, Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK), and Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK). 
We have tried to assist FS by doing research into how it could improve its organizational 
efficiency, in addition to how the organization could be better unified.  
In addition to the existing literature, our research relied heavily on the statistical 
data to which we were given access by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
(Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt, FFI). Our analysis has mainly consisted of frequency 
analysis, but we also utilized regression analysis in order to answer our research question. 
We began the thesis with an overview of the history of the Norwegian Special 
Operations Forces (NORSOF). We traced its legacy back to the World War II era with 
Kompani Linge and Shetlandsgjengen before we looked at the establishment of FSK as 
an organization, which can be traced back to 1962 when Hærens fallskjermjegerskole 
[The Army’s Paratrooper School] was established. Events in the late 1970s led to the 
creation of FSK, a unit in Hærens Jegerskole (HJS) [The Army’s Ranger School]. FSK’s 
primary role was to support the police in the defense of the many offshore installations in 
the North Sea; it consisted of specially trained paratroopers. HJS received praise for the 
work it did throughout the 1990s in the Balkans, and in 1997 it changed its name to 
Hærens Jegerkommando (HJK) to communicate that the unit was no longer a school 
institution, but a special unit on standby for both national and international missions. The 
 
154 Carly Fiorina. http://money.cnn.com/2007/10/23/news/newsmakers 
/fiorina_hp.fortune/?postversion=2007102407, accessed December 2013. 
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unit has been deployed multiple times to Afghanistan and in 2013 it changed its name to 
Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK). 
We next examined MJK’s history: Based on its WWII experiences, the Royal 
Norwegian Navy decided to establish a frogman unit in the winter of 1951-1952. 
Frogman units during the war proved to be an effective tool and the intent was that 
Norwegian frogmen should be able to conduct underwater sabotage, beach 
reconnaissance, and mine clearance operations. The complex nature of these operations 
led to a split in 1968 when the unit was divided in two: an offensive element consisting of 
Marinejegere (MJ) and a defensive element consisting of Minedykkere. The offensive 
element was initially given the name Marinejegerlaget (MJL), but in 1992 it changed its 
name to Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK), which it still holds today. As with FSK, the 
unit has been deployed multiple times to Afghanistan. MJK has also been deployed twice 
to the Gulf of Aden.  
Following our review of each unit’s history, we looked at the many recurring 
attempts to merge the two units. We found that, since the 1970’s, these attempts have 
been initiated by both the Army and the Navy, with divergent approaches reflecting 
different reasoning and assessments. In this part of the thesis we focused especially on 
the events of the last fifteen years. In these years FSK and MJK competed for tasks and 
operational legitimacy most of the time when they deployed to the same area they did so 
separately and successively. As a consequence, we suggested that the relationship 
between the two units had not been healthy or efficient. Small wonder that when the 
future organizational design for NORSOF was publicly highlighted in 2012-2013, 
members of both units reacted strongly. 
Although the Chief of Defence (CHOD) recommended keeping one tactical 
squadron from MJK in Bergen and an element in Ramsund, under the planned design 
MJK as an organization would cease to exist. The remaining parts of MJK would be 
moved to Rena and assimilated into FSK. This recommendation led to some very rough 




rod, was scrutinized and deliberately put on the spot for an absence of leadership skills 
and for lacking a holistic, unbiased approach regarding the future organization of 
NORSOF, whose ends, ways, and means were not in alignment with governing political 
guidelines. After months of lobbying and meetings, the Minister of Defence made the 
decision to pull FSK and MJK out of their respective services (Army and Navy) and 
joined them together under a newly established command, Forsvarets Spesialstyrker (FS). 
In Chapter Two we then shifted our focus to organizational culture. We used the 
work of Edgar Schein to define and operationalize the concept. One of his suggestions is 
that culture can be developed in any group as long as the following three conditions are 
met: (1) the group has been together long enough to have shared significant problems, (2) 
the group has had opportunities to solve these problems and to observe the effects of its 
solutions, and (3) the group has taken in new members and passed on these solutions. 
Since FS has only existed since January 1, 2014, it has not met these conditions. We thus 
concluded that, for the time being, FS’s organizational culture is comprised of the 
organizational cultures of both FSK and MJK. Statistical data support this conclusion. 
We followed this theoretical discussion with a look at the functionality and 
strength of FSK’s and MJK’s respective cultures. FSK and MJK share a macroculture 
(Norway), an organizational culture (the Armed Forces), and parts of two subcultures 
(the Navy and the Army). These findings led us to the conclusion that both units share 
many similarities and, in theory, there should be no cultural hindrances between them. 
To answer our research question and address how FS can improve its 
organizational efficiency, we turned to the Denison model for help.  
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Figure 32.  The Denison Model 
As you can see in Figure 32 we find Beliefs and Assumptions in the center of the 
model. We related this to Schein’s three levels of culture. The Denison model does not 
set out to measure Schein’s “deeper” levels; it is a tool only meant to measure the aspects 
of culture that are related to performance. Denison’s empirical research has shown that 
high performing organizations have high cultural scores in the four traits of Mission, 
Consistency, Involvement, and Adaptability. In addition to the four traits, the model 
highlights the two challenges all organizations must deal with at the same time: external 
adaptation and internal integration. The model also highlights the four tensions that every 
organization must deal with: the trade-off between focusing internally and externally, and 
the trade-off between stability and flexibility. 
By using FS’s circumplex report (see Figure 33) we found that FS scores higher 
on the flexible traits (Adaptability and Involvement) than on the stable traits (Mission 
and Consistency). It also scores higher on the internal focus traits (Involvement and 
Consistency) than on the external focus traits (Adaptability and Mission). This indicates 
that FS is a flexible organization that has an internal focus. It also indicates that FS has a 
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low capacity to remain stable over time. The relatively higher diagonal score on external 
adaptability versus internal consistency indicates that the organization adapts well to the 
external environment and it shows that FS is very much a “bottom-up” organization, 
something the high diagonal score on Involvement versus Mission indicates. 
 
 
Figure 33.  Circumplex report Forsvarets Spesialstyrker  
We also used the FS’s circumplex report to find out how FS could improve its 
overall organizational performance. We found that if FS wants to increase its overall 
organizational performance it must, according to Denison, do the following:  
• Improve the Mission trait by: 1) making the organization’s strategic 
direction clearer, 2) attain more widespread agreement about FS’s goals, 
and 3) providing a vision about FS’s future 
• Improve the Consistency trait by: 1) handling key issues better and 2) 
better coordinating projects between the units 
• Keep up the good work regarding Involvement 
• Improve the Adaptability trait by: 1) listening to, and acting on inputs 
from the rest of the Norwegian Armed Forces, as well as 2) facilitating 
better cooperation between the units to create change. 
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In the last section of Chapter II we turned our focus toward the merger process. 
We found that there seems to be an agreement among researchers that merger failures 
occur due to too little attention having been paid to human factors and, more specifically, 
to the cultural challenges these mergers generate. We used Henning Bang’s conclusion 
that there are two primary factors that are crucial if the process of merging is to succeed: 
1) there needs to be cultural compatibility between the two merging organizations, and 2) 
the handling of the merging process matters. That led us to consider whether FSK and 
MJK are compatible, and how the process of merging had been addressed and handled. 
Of note: Our conclusion is that the two cultures are, in fact compatible, on all of the 
issues we analyzed except for the idea of a future merger of the two tactical units. 
The final thing we did in this chapter before we turned to the challenges of 
unification was to look at the handling of the merger process, which in turn led us to look 
at merge strategies depicted in the literature. In the light of these strategies, we found that 
the CHOD’s initial plan to assimilate MJK into FSK would not have worked; MJK’s 
culture is too strong. In Oslo on March 31, 2014, FS’s Commanding Officer, Rear 
Admiral Nils Johan Holte, noted that both FSK and MJK should continue to cultivate 
close relations with the two armed services from which each originated. We think that 
this indicates that the current strategy, deliberate or not, is to keep the units separate. 
Consequently, for now the two units’ cultures will live side by side within FS. We think 
that the preferred merger strategy for FS over time should be integration, taking the best 
of both FSK and MJK to create FS’s organizational culture. We are well aware that this 
process cannot be forced, but with careful leadership and FS’s facilitation, the result will 
eventually be better than if the two “live” side by side. 
To look more deeply into the importance of, and interconnectivity between, 
culture and leadership in the forging process of FS, we divided our leadership chapter 
into three sections: why leadership is important, how leadership should be executed, and, 
finally, which leadership tools should be emphasized. 
Leadership is important because it begins the culture creation process and it is 
also responsible for changing culture. Leadership plays an initiating role. Hence, 
leadership at every level articulates the rules of social order and the way people in the 
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organization interact. Leadership also initiates how to bring a group of people together 
for some purpose. Leaders will, in general, be viewed as founders and it is critical for 
leaders to be good examples, bearing in mind that they are looked up to for approval of 
their subordinates’ actions. We think that how leadership is executed in both FSK and 
MJK, and in FS as a whole, will determine how well NORSOF operates internally and 
externally.  
Organizational change resulting in creation of new group processes, such as FS, is 
unavoidable; this, in and of itself, makes leadership execution at all levels tremendously 
important. Our analysis of the statistical data revealed that the majority (73%) of survey 
respondents indicated that leaders in FS right now possess congruence between what they 
preach and what they practice. We also found that, to a lesser degree (49%), respondents 
indicate that the leadership they see is consistent across the organization. These survey 
results indicate that members strongly believe that their leaders are very good as a whole, 
but that they do not yet see the collective leadership seeming to think or act as one.  
Vision, articulated in goals and objectives, is important for managing and 
changing/adjusting culture. Our findings suggested two things: (1) respondents have a 
generally positive view about vision articulation, but (2) quite a few, and arguably too 
many, chose the “neutral alternative,” which suggests that they do not care, or do not 
know, or are unsure.   
While leadership is among the most studied subjects, it is also the least 
understood. To achieve unity and increased efficiency requires a good leader-follower 
relationship, especially since unleashing the full potential in others is the surest path to 
achieving collective efficiency. Because decision making at the lowest level possible, 
delegating authority, personal empowerment, and disciplined initiative and risk-taking 
are clearly traits that are in play in FS. FS should move from detailed order-based 
leadership, which aims to avoid uncertainty, to a form of leadership that considers 
uncertainty as a central element and recognizes the true value of mission command 
leadership philosophy; 
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We noted that outstanding leadership manifests itself primarily among a leader’s 
followers, and the notion of a cohesive team is significant; people are the precious 
resource, and constitute social capital. While a soft touch with people is thus critical, it 
should not prevent a real touch when it comes to combat missions and the need for 
dedication and discipline. It is really up to leadership to create an environment where 
people really do matter. At the same time, leaders who unleash the best in people end up 
with people who, in turn, make those at the top look like geniuses. 
The importance of team orientation in Special Operation Forces should be beyond 
dispute. Team orientation should not be limited to combat, however; a mission extends 
far beyond the execution of H-hour. All SOF missions involve both preparation and post-
action analysis. This is one reason team orientation is important even for SOF units’ daily 
routines. FS’s sub-units, historically, are independently oriented around teams, but the 
team orientation is weak in the newly established FS itself. The new “team”, FS, has not 
yet gained momentum as a team. To do so will require reliance on the same three tenets 
of communication, commitment, and trust that one sees in the most successful SOF 
teams.  
Even as we highlighted the triangle of Communication, Commitment, and Trust 
(CCT), we propose that communication be considered the way, commitment the means, 
and trust the ends.  
Communication is a system, and does not involve just spoken or written language. 
The best way to communicate values and common bonds in FS is through behavior. 
Members of MJK exhibit significantly less confidence than do those of FSK that there is 
good communication in FS. In addition, one out of three in FS as a whole disagree or 
strongly disagree that there is good communication in the organization, while another 
third “have no opinion.” Survey results thus suggest that FS must do better at 
communicating its vision and goals. Furthermore, FS needs to work in a consistent, 
innovative, and predictable way, emphasizing cooperation and avoiding short term 
solutions that might impede long-term strategy.  
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We drew a sharp distinction between commitment and obedience or conformity, 
both of which can lead to cohesion that is too strong, resulting in such things as 
groupthink, anchoring, social proof, or deduction which foster biases and other cognitive 
traps. At the same time, we do not believe it is possible for commitment to be so strong 
that it hampers efficiency or the quality of performance. Our research indicates that 
commitment can be achieved in two ways: (1) commitment to the leadership and its 
significance, and (2) commitment to the tasks and constellations of relations, both current 
and future. Currently, members of MJK appear to have significantly less confidence than 
those in FSK that there is commitment in FS.   
Trust is not a stand-alone trait; it depends on, and first requires, communication 
(the way) and commitment (the means). Trust must be earned and it must be extended to 
others. Trust, meaning confidence, is crucial to FS’s forging process. Trust lies at the 
heart of a functioning, cohesive team. Fundamental to smooth functioning is being 
willing to be open and honest without worrying that what you say can be used against 
you. Feeling that you belong, straightforward communication, and commitment to a task 
all enhance trust, cooperation, and problem solving. Here, too, MJK members have less 
confidence than do those of FSK that there is sufficient trust in FS.  
 Future Studies and Considerations 
Never let the future disturb you. You will meet it, if you have to, with the 
same weapons of reason which today arm you against the present.155 
This thesis is quite narrow in its scope. Its intent is to assist FS with its forging 
process, focusing on the importance of culture and leadership. FSK and MJK have 
developed their own unit-specific beliefs, values, and assumptions. We believe that it is 
vital to reconcile the past, make the most of common strengths, and create the future 
together. There are several, actually numerous, topics that need to be addressed and 
investigated to ensure optimal organizational efficiency in FS. Some of these topics 
emerged through our review of the literature regarding merger processes and some are 
based on what we know from our own SOF experience.  
155 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 76. 
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Organizational design is important, assuming the design is optimal and adaptive 
to the circumstances, and that the organization possesses the means to achieve its desired 
ends. FFI’s survey indicates that the majority (71%) of FS’s members do not agree that 
FS is optimally organized today. The survey does not tell us “what is wrong,” but it 
definitely suggests that there is room for improvement. In conjunction with design is the 
question of a merger. Commander FS has publicly stated that “FSK and MJK will wear 
their respective uniforms.” For the foreseeable future FSK and MJK will be affiliated 
with their respective Services. But is it possible that having two semi-independent units 
under one overarching joint command amounts to a double-edged sword? Especially 
since (1) FSK is bigger than MJK, most significantly when it comes to staff/support, (2) 
FSK has higher ranking officers than MJK in identical positions, (3) FSK has a unit name 
that indicates its affiliation with and reporting responsibility to the Armed Forces as a 
whole, while MJK, in its name, is aligned with only the Navy.  
While still on the topic of optimal organization, it is also vital to review selection 
and the division of labor. The FFI survey clearly indicates that there are discrepancies 
regarding these issues (Chapter II, section C, paragraph 1a). Selection, in and of itself, is 
worth mentioning since it is a deeply rooted “concept” in both units and is done 
differently in each. Built and adapted from different ideas, selection creates distinct 
cultural artifacts for both units. Furthermore, it creates an identity and heraldic 
expressions that are unique to each unit and critical to cohesion, morale, and esprit.  
We have not touched on the strategic utility of NORSOF, either domestically or 
abroad. This is a critically important issue, especially when talking about such a small but 
potent force. FFI has an ongoing project with FS and this should be continued in the 
future. Topics that are already being examined include: global trends in the SOF 
community, possible diminishment of national and international borders in counter-
terrorism operations, development and strengthening of SOF capabilities, use of SOF 
within Norway’s own borders, long-term planning for SOF purposes, adequate 
innovation of SOF, lack of national AIRSOF capabilities, future demands for SOF 
units/personnel, utilization of strategic resources, possible new SOF domains in 
conjunction with possible changing adversaries, and strategic leadership of SOF.   
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We believe that this thesis can contribute to these efforts by providing a good 
starting point for tracking FS’s progress in its forging process. FS, together with FFI, has 
taken the important initiative of compiling and conducting the survey which provided us 
with valuable data. The data set is more extensive and worth probing further for instance, 
too,  in a couple of years the survey can be distributed again so that a comparison analysis 
can be made to measure what has worked and what has not, given changes made. FS can 
then (re)adjust accordingly.  
Positive signs already exist—particularly in the realm of the division of labor and 
joint initiatives. It may be only hearsay, or the result of internal adjustments, but we do 
see more joint activities both domestically and abroad. These imminent and planned 
allocations for the near future point to a forward-leaning—and, we hope, attentive—FS. 
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APPENDIX A: EXCEPT OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
The next five pages offer an excerpt of the survey questionnaire that was 
configured and distributed by FFI. The original survey was more extensive; this appendix 
only depicts the questions that generated data that was utilized for the purpose of this 
thesis.  
Question numbers marked in red indicate questions generated by FFI; they are not 
part of the standard Denison questionnaire. The colors and divisions of Traits and Indexes 
correlate with Denison’s setup. The Norwegian text was translated as appropriately as 
possible into English and made relevant to the targets for the survey. Measurements for 
answering the questions are, in accord with to Denison: Strongly agree, Agree, Neutral, 
Disagree, Strongly disagree. For additional questions composed by FFI, measurements 




Question No. Trait Index Questions (English) Questions (Norwegian)
1 Involvement Empowerment Most unit members in FS (FSST, FSK, MJK) are highly involved in 
their work.
De fleste ansatte i FS (FSST, FSK, MJK) er svært engasjerte i 
arbeidet sitt.
2 Involvement Empowerment Decisions are usually made at the level where the best 
information is available.
Avgjørelser blir vanligvis tatt på nivået der den beste 
informasjonen er tilgjengelig.
3 Involvement Empowerment Information is widely shared so that everyone can get the 
information he or she needs when it is needed.
Informasjon blir formidlet slik at alle ansatte kan få den 
informasjonen de trenger når de trenger den.
4 Involvement Empowerment Everyone believes that he or she can have a positive impact. Alle mener at de kan ha en positiv innvirkning.
5 Involvement Empowerment Planning is ongoing and involves everyone in the process to some 
degree.
Planlegging pågår kontinuerlig, og alle ansatte involveres i 
prosessen til en viss grad.
6 Involvement Team Orientation Cooperation across different units (FSST, FSK, MJK) of FS is 
actively encouraged.
Det oppfordres aktivt til samarbeid mellom avdelingene i FS 
(FSST, FSK og MJK).
7 Involvement Team Orientation People work like they are part of a team. Folk jobber som om de er en del av et team.
8 Involvement Team Orientation Teamwork is used to get work done, rather than hierarchy. Teamarbeid brukes istedenfor hierarkiet for å få arbeidet gjort.
9 Involvement Team Orientation Teams are our primary building blocks. Team er våre primære byggeklosser.
10 Involvement Team Orientation Work is organized so that each person can see the relationship 
between his or her job and the goals of FS.
Arbeidet organiseres slik at ansatte kan forstå forholdet mellom 
jobben sin og FS sitt mål.
11 Involvement Capability 
Development
Authority is delegated so that people can act on their own. Myndighet delegeres så ansatte kan handle på egen hånd.
12 Involvement Capability 
Development
The "bench strenght" (capability of people) is constantly 
improving.
Ansattes ferdigheter forbedres stadig.
13 Involvement Capability 
Development
There is continous investment in the skills of unit members. Det investeres kontinuerlig i å styrke de ansattes ferdigheter.
14 Involvement Capability 
Development
The capabilities of people are viewed as an important source of 
competitive advantage.
De ansattes ferdigheter ansees som et viktig 
konkurransefortrinn.
15 Involvement Capability 
Development
Problems often arise because we do not have the skills necessary 
to do the job.
Det oppstår ofte problemer fordi vi ikke har ferdighetene som 
trenges for å gjøre jobben.
16
Please rank the following statements in how important they are 
to you. (Use "1" for most important and "3" for least important. 
Do not give any two items the same value)
- Unit members must have the opportunity to manage their own 
work
- We need to work cooperatively towards common goals
- We must continually invest in personal education and training
Vennligst ranger disse påstandene etter hvor viktig de er for deg. 
(Bruk "1" for mest viktig og "3" for minst viktig. Ikke gi samme 
verdi to ganger)
- Ansatte må ha muligheten til å styre sitt eget arbeid
- Vi trenger å jobbe sammen mot felles mål





Question No. Trait Index Questions (English) Questions (Norwegian)
17 Consistency Core Values The leaders in FS (FSST, FSK, MJK) "practice what they preach." Ledere i FS (FSST, FSK og MJK) leder ved å gå foran som gode 
eksempler.
18 Consistency Core Values There is a characteristic leadership style and a distinct set of 
management practices.
Det finnes en karakteristisk lederstil og tydelige 
ledelsesprosedyrer.
19 Consistency Core Values There is a clear and consistent set of values that governs the way 
we operate in FS (FSST, FSK, MJK).
Det finnes klare og konsekvente verdier som styrer måten vi 
jobber på i FS (FSST, FSK og MJK).
20 Consistency Core Values Ignoring core values will get you in trouble. Du blir stilt til ansvar hvis du ignorerer våre kjerneverdier.
21 Consistency Core Values There is an ethical code that guides our behavior and tells us 
right from wrong.
Det finnes en etisk kode som styrer atferden vår og som forteller 
hva som er riktig og hva som er galt.
22 Consistency Agreement When disagreemnets occur, we work har to achieve "win-win" 
solutions.
Når det oppstår uenigheter anstrenger vi oss for å oppnå 
løsninger som er til fordel for alle.
23 Consistency Agreement There is a "strong" culture in FS (FSST, FSK, MJK). Det finnes en etablert organisasjonskultur i FS (FSST, FSK og 
MJK).
24 Consistency Agreement It is easy to reach consensus, even on difficult issues. Det er enkelt å komme fram til enighet, selv når det gjelder 
vanskelige saker.
25 Consistency Agreement We often have trouble reaching agreement on key issues. Vi har ofte problemer med å oppnå enighet når det gjelder 
nøkkelsaker.
26 Consistency Agreement There is a clear agreement about the right way and the wrong 
way to do things.
Det finnes klar enighet om riktig og gal måte å gjøre ting på.
27 Consistency Coordination & 
Integration
FS' (FSST, FSK, MJK) approach in operating is very consistent and 
predictable.
Måten FS (FSST, FSK og MJK) drives på er svært konsekvent og 
forutsigbar.
28 Consistency Coordination & 
Integration
People from different parts of your unit share common 
perspective.
Folk i de forskjellige deler av organisasjonen deler felles 
perspektiv.
29 Consistency Coordination & 
Integration
It is easy to coordinate projects across different sub-units (FSST, 
FSK, MJK) of FS.
Det er enkelt å koordinere prosjekter på tvers av avdelingene i 




Working with someone from another sub-unit (FSST, FSK, or MJK) 
in FS is like working with someone from a different organization.
Å jobbe sammen med noen fra en annen del av FS (FSST, FSK eller 
MJK) er som å jobbe med noen fra en annen organisasjon.
31 Consistency Coordination & 
Integration
There is good alignment of goals across levels. Det er god oppslutning rundt målene på tvers av ansatte på alle 
nivåer.
32
Please rank the following statements in how important they are 
to you. (Use "1" for most important and "3" for least important. 
Do not give any two items the same value)
- Personnel in your unit share the same set of values and beliefs
- Personnel in your unit need to agree on critical issues
- The different sub-units of your organization need to work 
together to achieve common goals
Vennligst ranger disse påstandene etter hvor viktig de er for deg. 
(Bruk "1" for mest viktig og "3" for minst viktig. Ikke gi samme 
verdi to ganger)
- Personell i din avdeling deler de samme verdiene
- Personell i din avdeling trenger å være enige om kritiske 
spørsmål 
- De forskjellige delene av din organisasjon trenger å jobbe 
sammen for å oppnå felles målsetninger
33
Of the following sentences, which ones do you think need to be 
common within FS? Choose the top four from:                  
Initiative, Collectivism, Compliance, Empowerment, 
     
Hvilke av de følgende egenskapene mener du bør være felles for 
alle i FS? Velg de fire viktigste av:                                         
Initiativ, Kollektivisme, Myndighetsgjørelse, Ettergivenhet, 
     
34
Complete the following sentence. FSK and MJK need to work 
together ________.                                                                  
Much Less, Less often, As they do now, More often, Much more
Fullfør følgende setning. FSK og MJK trenger å jobbe ______ 
sammen.                                                                                     





Question No. Trait Index Questions (English) Questions (Norwegian)
35 Adaptability Creating Change The way things are done is very flexible and easy to change. Ting gjøres på en svært fleksibel måte og det er enkelt å endre 
på dem.
36 Adaptability Creating Change We respond well to adversaries and other changes in the 
operating environment.
Vi er flinke til å reagere på motstandere og endringer i 
operasjonsmiljøet.
37 Adaptability Creating Change New and improved ways to do work are continually adopted. Nye og bedre måter å gjøre arbeidet på innføres fortløpende.
38 Adaptability Creating Change Attempts to create change is usually met with resistance. Forsøk på å innføre endringer blir som oftest møtt med motstand.
39 Adaptability Creating Change Different parts of FS (FSST, FSK, MJK) often cooperate to create 
change.
Forskjellige deler av FS (FSST, FSK og MJK) samarbeider ofte for å 
innføre endring.
40 Adaptability Customer Focus Norwegian Armed Forces' comments and recommendations often 
lead to changes.
Kommentarer og anbefalinger fra resten av forsvaret fører ofte til 
endringer.
41 Adaptability Customer Focus Input form the Norwegian Armed Forces' leadership directly 
influences our decisions.
Tilbakemeldinger fra resten av forsvaret  har direkte innflytelse 
på våre avgjørelser.
42 Adaptability Customer Focus All members have a deep understanding of what the Norwegian 
Armed Forces wants and needs.
Alle ansatte har en dyp forståelse av forsvarets ønsker og behov.
43 Adaptability Customer Focus The interest of the Norwegian Armed Forces often get ignored in 
our decisions.
Resten av forsvarets interesser ignoreres ofte når vi tar våre 
avgjørelser.
44 Adaptability Customer Focus We encourage direct contact with the Norwegian Armed Forces 
for our people.
Vi oppmuntrer våre folk til å ha direkte kontakt med resten av 
forsvaret.
45 Adaptability Organizational 
Learning
We view failure as an oppertunity for learning and improvement. Vi ser på mislykkede tiltak som en anledning til å lære og 
forbedre oss.
46 Adaptability Organizational 
Learning
Innovation and risk taking are encouraged and rewarded. Det å være innovativ og det å ta sjanser oppfordres og belønnes.
47 Adaptability Organizational 
Learning
Lots of things "fall vetween the cracks." Det finnes mye som “faller mellom stolene”.
48 Adaptability Organizational 
Learning
Learning is an importnat objective in our day-to-day work. Å lære er et viktig mål i det daglige arbeidet.
49 Adaptability Organizational 
Learning
We make certain that the "right hand knows what the left hand is 
doing."
Vi forsiker oss om at den “høyre hånden vet hva venstre hånden 
gjør”.
50
Please rank the following statements in how important they are 
to you. (Use "1" for most important and "3" for least important. 
Do not give any two items the same value)
- Your unit needs to be able to adapt quickly to changes in the 
operating environment
- FS needs to fulfill higher echelon requirements
- Your unit needs to stimulate innovation and creativity
Vennligst ranger disse påstandene etter hvor viktig de er for deg. 
(Bruk "1" for mest viktig og "3" for minst viktig. Ikke gi samme 
verdi to ganger)
- Din avdeling trenger å tilpasse seg hurtig til endringer i 
operasjons miljøet.
- FS trenger å oppfylle kravene fra høyere nivå.  
- Din avdeling må stimulere innovasjon og kreativitet.
51
Who's requirements are the most important to fulfill? Please rank 
the following "organizations" in how important it is for your unit. 
(use "1" for the most important and "6" for the least important. 
Do not give any two items the same value):
- FS
- Own unit (Army/Navy)
- Ministry of Defence
- Ministry of Justice and Public Security
- NATO
- NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation)
Hvem sine krav er viktigst å fylle? Ranger følgende 
organisasjoner (bruk "1" for viktigst og "6" for minst viktig. Ikke 
gi samme verdi to ganger):                                                                    
- FS
- Egen taktisk avdeling (Army/Navy)
- Forsvarsdepartementet
- Justis- og Beredskapsdepartementet
- NATO







Question No. Trait Index Questions (English) Questions (Norwegian)
52 Mission Strategic Direction & 
Intent
There is a long-term purpose and direction for FS (FSST, FSK, MJK). Det finnes langsiktige mål og retninger i FS (FSST, FSK og MJK). 
53 Mission Strategic Direction & 
Intent
Our strategy leads other SOF units to change the way they 
compete in our field of expertise.
Vår strategi fører til at andre SOF organisasjoner forandrer måten 
de arbeider på.
54 Mission Strategic Direction & 
Intent
There is a clear mission that gives meaning and direction to our 
work.
Det finnes et klart idegrunnlag som gir vårt arbeid mening og 
retning.
55 Mission Strategic Direction & 
Intent
There is a clear strategy for the future. Det finnes en klar framtidsstrategi.
56 Mission Strategic Direction & 
Intent
 Our strategic directions is unclear to me. Vår strategiske retning er uklar for meg.
57 Mission Goals & Objectives There is a widespread agreement about goals in my unit. Det er omfattende enighet om våre mål.
58 Mission Goals & Objectives  Leaders set goals that are ambitious, but realistic. Lederne setter mål som er ambisiøse, men realistiske.
59 Mission Goals & Objectives The leadership has "gone on record" about the objectives we are 
trying to meet.
Ledelsen har tydelig uttrykt målene som vi forsøker å nå.
60 Mission Goals & Objectives We continously track our progress against our stated goals. Vi sammenligner hele tiden framgangen vår med våre fastsatte 
mål.
61 Mission Goals & Objectives People understand what needs to be done for us to succeed in 
the long run.
Folk forstår hva vi må gjøre for å lykkes i det lange løp.
62 Mission Vision We have a shared vision of what FS (FSST, FSK, MJK) will be like in 
the future.
Vi har en felles visjon om hvordan FS (FSST, FSK og MJK) vil være i 
framtiden.
63 Mission Vision Leaders have a long-term viewpoint. Lederne tenker langsiktig.
64 Mission Vision Short-term thinking often compromises our long-term vision. Kortsiktig tenking gjør ofte at man går på kompromiss med 
langtidsvisjonen vår.
65 Mission Vision Our vision creates excitement and motivation for our people. Vår visjon skaper begeistring og motiverer de ansatte.
66 Mission Vision We are able to meet short-term demands without compromising 
our long-term vision.
Vi klarer å innfri korttidskravene uten å gå på kompromiss med 
langtidsvisjonen vår.
67
Please rank the following statements in how important they are 
to you. (Use "1" for most important and "3" for least important. 
Do not give any two items the same value)
- You unit needs to distringuish itself from FSK/MJK
- Every member in your unit need to know what the mission is
- There is a shared view amongst the members of what we want 
to achieve
Vennligst ranger disse påstandene etter hvor viktig de er for deg. 
(Bruk "1" for mest viktig og "3" for minst viktig. Ikke gi samme 
verdi to ganger)
- Din avdeling trenger å være annerledes enn den andre 
avdelingen. 
- Alle i din avdeling trenger å vite hva idegrunnlaget er.
- Det er en felles forståelse blandt medlemene i din organisasjon 
om hva dere ønsker å oppnå.
68
What mission type do you think are more important for FS? Please 
rank these missions in priority. (Use "1" for the most important 




Hvilke type oppdrag syntes du er viktigst for FS? (Bruk "1" for 
viktigst og "2" for minst viktig. Ikke gi samme verdi to ganger)
- Nasjonale oppdrag
- Internasjonale oppdrag
69 What operating enivonment should your unit focus on, 
Land/Sea/Both? (Check only one box)
Hvilket domene bør din avdeling fokusere på,              
Land/Sjø/Begge? (Kryss av en) 
70
What operating enivonment should the other unit (FSK/MJK) focus 
on, Land/Sea/Both? (Check only one box)
Hvilke domene bør den andre avdelingen (FSK/MJK) fokusere på, 
Land/Sjø/Begge? (Kryss av en)
71
Interchangeability between individuals/teams from FSK and MJK 
should be a goal?                                                                         
Strongly Disagree - Disagree - Neutral - Agree - Strongly Agree
Ombyttbarhet mellom avdelingen av operatører/team er et mål? 
Med ombyttbarhet menes at personell (individ/team) kan 
benyttes i begge taktiske avdelingene ved behov og at dette ikke 
krever noen form for ny seleksjon/prøve. Også at personell kan 
søke stillinger i begge taktiske avdelinger med samme 
argumentasjon. Enkelt betyr det at det er "plug-and-play" mellom 
de to taktiske avdelingene, dette kan gjelde på kort/midlertidig 
og lang/fast sikt.                                                                         





Demographics do not show measurements due to classification and PIIs. We had 
limited access to these demographics and those we had are left out in this table. 
Question No. Trait Index Questions (English) Questions (Norwegian)
72 Comparison
Compared to the other tactical unit, how would you assess your 
units efficiency in the following areas?
- External Resource Allocation by MoD
- Appropriate internal Resource Allocation
- New TTP Development
- Group Loyalty
- Unit member Satisfaction
- Quality of the Unit's operators
- Quality of the Unit's staff members
- The readiness of the unit to conduct its mission
- Overall Organization Performance
- Quality of selection course                                                           
Much lower, Lower, Same, Higher, Much higher, Don't know
Sammenlignet med den andre avdelingen, hvordan vil du vurdere 
din avdelings effiktivitet på følgende områder?
- Tildelte midler fra FD
- Bruk av midler internt
- Utvikling av nye TTP'er
- Gruppe lojalitet
- Ansattes tilfredstillelse
- Kvaliteten på operatører
- Kvaliteten på stab / støtte
- Beredskapen for å utføre tildelte oppdrag
- Total organisasjons ytelse
- Kvalitet på seleksjonskurs                                                         
Mye lavere, lavere, Samme, Høyere, Mye høyere, Vet ikke
73 Comparison
Please rank the following values in how important you think they 
are for FS. (Using "1" for most strongest and "4" for least 
strongest. Do not give any two items the same value)
- Innvolvement of members in the FS organization
- Clear sense of purpose and direction of FS
- Consensus between members of FS
- Adaptability of FS members to new situations
Vennligst ranger disse påstandene etter hvor viktig du tror de er 
for FS. (Bruk "1" for mest viktig og "4" for minst viktig. Ikke gi 
samme verdi to ganger)
- De ansattes engasjement i FS organisasjonen. 
- Klar mening og retning for FS.
- Konsensus blandt medlemmene i FS.
- FS ansattes tilpasningsevne til nye situasjoner. 
74 Comparison
Please rank the following values in what you think is strongest 
present in YOUR unit. (Using "1" for most strongest and "4" for 
least strongest. Do not give any two items the same value)
- Innvolvement of members in the FS organization
- Clear sense of purpose and direction of FS
- Consensus between members of FS
- Adaptability of FS members to new situations
Vennligst ranger disse påstandene etter hvor viktig du tror de er 
for DIN avdeling. (Bruk "1" for mest viktig og "4" for minst viktig. 
Ikke gi samme verdi to ganger)
- De ansattes engasjement i FS organisasjonen. 
- Klar mening og rettning for FS.
- Konsensus blandt medlemmene i FS.
- FS ansattes tilpasningsevne til nye situasjoner. 
75 Comparison
Please rank the following values in what you think is strongest 
present in THE OTHER unit. (Using "1" for most strongest and "4" 
for least strongest. Do not give any two items the same value)
- Innvolvement of members in the FS organization
- Clear sense of purpose and direction of FS
- Consensus between members of FS
- Adaptability of FS members to new situations
Vennligst ranger disse påstandene etter hvor viktig du tror de er 
for den ANDRE avdelingen. (Bruk "1" for mest viktig og "4" for 
minst viktig. Ikke gi samme verdi to ganger)
- De ansattes engasjement i FS organisasjonen. 
- Klar mening og rettning for FS.
- Konsensus blandt medlemmene i FS.
- FS ansattes tilpasningsevne til nye situasjoner. 
76 Comparison
Please assess the following statements.
- Today (as of 01.01.2014), FS is organized in a optimal way.
- In the future Norway should have one tactical SOF unit with the 
same capabilities as FSK and MJK.                                             
Strongly Disagree - Disagree - Neutral - Agree - Strongly Agree
Vennligst ta stilling til følgende påstander.
- FS er optimalt organisert i dag (per 01.01.2014)
- I fremtiden bør Norge kun ha en taktisk avdeling med 
tilsvarende kapabiliteter som FSK og MJK besitter i dag.           
Helt uenig, delvis uenig, Hverken enig eller uenig, Delvis Enig, 
Helt enig
Question No. Trait Index Questions (English) Questions (Norwegian)
77 Demographics How many years have you served in Norwegian Armed Forces? Hvor mange år har du tjenestegjort i forsvaret?
78 Demographics How many years have you served in FSK? Hvor mange år har du tjenestegjort i FSK (FSK/HJK)?
79 Demographics How many years have you served in MJK? Hvor mange år har du tjenestegjort i MJK?
80 Demographics How many years have you served in FSST (FST/SOA)? Hvor mange år har du tjenestegjort i FSST (FST/SOA)?
81 Demographics How many years have you served outside FS (FSST, FSK, MJK)? Hvor mange år har du tjenestegjort utenfor FS (FSST, FSK og 
MJK)?
82 Demographics In which sub-unit are you currently posted? I hvilke avdeleling er du nå?
83 Demographics What is your age? Hva er din alder?
84 Demographics Which categori are you? I hvilke kategori er du?
85 Demographics What background do you have? Hvilke bakgrunn har du?
86 Demographics How many times have you been deployed? Hvor mange ganger har du vært deployert?
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APPENDIX B: SELECTED REGRESSION ANALYSIS TABLES 
Below: Output from initial regression (first iteration) analysis where 
y=Communication and x1 through x11 represents Involvement and demographics.  
 
 
Below: Output from final regression (fifth iteration) analysis where 
y=Communication and x’s represents Involvement and demographics. Question numbers 










df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3209,091624 291,7356 7,902067 5,58058E-11
Residual 6165,455862 36,9189
Total 9374,547486
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 30,67528214 5,275489697 5,81468 3,014E-08 20,26003604 41,0905282 20,260036 41,09052823
X1 1,109786638 0,417337177 2,659209 0,0085948 0,285849969 1,93372331 0,28584997 1,933723307
X2 2,389316132 0,603606735 3,958399 0,0001114 1,197632886 3,58099938 1,19763289 3,580999378
X3 1,053471589 0,69327571 1,519556 0,1305135 -0,315242511 2,42218569 -0,3152425 2,422185688
X4 0,183023393 0,672066745 0,272329 0,7857053 -1,143818462 1,50986525 -1,1438185 1,509865249
X5 -1,107289305 0,965206893 -1,1472 0,2529382 -3,01286924 0,79829063 -3,0128692 0,798290631
X6 0,370739229 0,606561488 0,611215 0,5418886 -0,826777501 1,56825596 -0,8267775 1,568255958
X7 -2,070503214 0,797153197 -2,59737 0,0102327 -3,64429962 -0,49670681 -3,6442996 -0,496706809
X8 -0,350282401 0,988829997 -0,35424 0,7236065 -2,302500744 1,60193594 -2,3025007 1,601935943
X9 -1,803930658 1,117686885 -1,61399 0,1084184 -4,010547414 0,4026861 -4,0105474 0,402686098
X10 0,156392258 0,321677638 0,486177 0,6274791 -0,478686559 0,79147108 -0,4786866 0,791471076








df SS MS F Significance F
Regresjon 2979,356877 744,8392 20,265545 1,01554E-13
Residualer 6395,190609 36,75397
Totalt 9374,547486
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 36,12277375 4,103641587 8,802614 1,301E-15 28,02345147 44,222096 28,0234515 44,22209602
Question 6 1,078524231 0,408707426 2,638866 0,0090732 0,271861883 1,88518658 0,27186188 1,885186579
Question 7 2,864458947 0,532602803 5,378227 2,398E-07 1,813265354 3,91565254 1,81326535 3,915652541
Question 81 -2,057491104 0,708820978 -2,90269 0,0041787 -3,456485 -0,65849721 -3,456485 -0,658497208
Question 73 -2,726816446 0,861894512 -3,16375 0,0018385 -4,427930267 -1,02570262 -4,4279303 -1,025702625
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Below: Output from initial regression (first iteration) analysis where 
y=Communication and x1 through x12 represents Adaptability and demographics. 
 
 
Below: Output from final regression (sixth iteration) analysis where 
y=Communication and x’s represents Adaptability and demographics. Question numbers 










df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2617,115194 218,0929 5,357572 1,23626E-07
Residual 6757,432292 40,70742
Total 9374,547486
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 32,7058998 5,397835451 6,059077 8,9E-09 22,0486415 43,363158 22,0486415 43,36315816
X1 -0,0530554 1,00740626 -0,05267 0,958062 -2,042035728 1,935925 -2,04203573 1,935925012
X2 0,32950643 0,648781625 0,507885 0,612208 -0,951420611 1,6104335 -0,95142061 1,610433464
X3 -2,2958549 0,82154654 -2,79455 0,005809 -3,917881738 -0,6738282 -3,91788174 -0,67382816
X4 -1,4465029 1,030679553 -1,40345 0,162352 -3,481433052 0,5884273 -3,48143305 0,588427305
X5 -2,3599879 1,171369389 -2,01473 0,045548 -4,672690184 -0,0472857 -4,67269018 -0,04728569
X6 0,251144 0,338950634 0,740946 0,459773 -0,418065817 0,9203538 -0,41806582 0,920353813
X7 1,01869336 0,972455673 1,047547 0,29637 -0,901282048 2,9386688 -0,90128205 2,938668766
X8 1,47565205 0,622104731 2,372032 0,018836 0,247394741 2,7039094 0,24739474 2,703909353
X9 0,41594305 0,653445113 0,636539 0,525302 -0,874191381 1,7060775 -0,87419138 1,706077482
X10 1,75587027 0,662283621 2,651236 0,008797 0,448285459 3,0634551 0,44828546 3,063455078
X11 0,6443118 0,582754347 1,105632 0,270486 -0,506253772 1,7948774 -0,50625377 1,794877366








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2344,983798 586,2459 14,51111 3,02211E-10
Residual 7029,563688 40,39979
Total 9374,547486
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 38,3425441 4,522701082 8,477798 9,51E-15 29,4161277 47,268961 29,4161277 47,26896052
Question 82 -2,4223687 0,726017186 -3,33652 0,001037 -3,855302559 -0,9894347 -3,85530256 -0,98943475
Question 84 -2,8127773 0,899693315 -3,12637 0,002075 -4,588494333 -1,0370603 -4,58849433 -1,03706035
Question 35 1,86214329 0,561117888 3,318631 0,001102 0,754669714 2,9696169 0,75466971 2,969616859
Question 37 2,06833321 0,594149177 3,481168 0,000631 0,895666066 3,2410004 0,89566607 3,241000355
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Below: Output from initial regression (first iteration) analysis where 
y=Communication and x1 through x11 represents Mission and demographics. 
 
 
Below: Output from final regression (sixth iteration) analysis where 
y=Communication and x’s represents Mission and demographics. Question numbers refer 











df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4723,490113 393,6241761 14,04876526 7,33473E-20
Residual 4651,057373 28,01841791
Total 9374,547486
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 22,67674925 4,381635361 5,175407669 6,50089E-07 14,02583346 31,32766505 14,02583346 31,32766505
X1 0,313624725 0,830571337 0,37760119 0,706209231 -1,326220243 1,953469693 -1,326220243 1,953469693
X2 -0,009724219 0,529828005 -0,01835354 0,985378857 -1,055794254 1,036345815 -1,055794254 1,036345815
X3 -0,809022311 0,707633851 -1,143278137 0,254569234 -2,206144698 0,588100077 -2,206144698 0,588100077
X4 -0,810821304 0,85249896 -0,951111194 0,342930682 -2,493959245 0,872316637 -2,493959245 0,872316637
X5 -0,931886049 0,982113179 -0,948858104 0,344072111 -2,870928829 1,007156731 -2,870928829 1,007156731
X6 0,145801734 0,278438737 0,523640264 0,60122714 -0,403935949 0,695539416 -0,403935949 0,695539416
X7 0,403494626 0,806849221 0,500086777 0,617676262 -1,189514398 1,99650365 -1,189514398 1,99650365
X8 1,370247882 0,44584209 3,073392827 0,0024746 0,48999609 2,250499675 0,48999609 2,250499675
X9 1,137939639 0,475993143 2,390663934 0,017937557 0,198158882 2,077720397 0,198158882 2,077720397
X10 0,959596828 0,462217767 2,07607084 0,039428798 0,047013591 1,872180064 0,047013591 1,872180064
X11 2,915402412 0,624381615 4,669263703 6,20624E-06 1,682649723 4,148155101 1,682649723 4,148155101








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4550,749113 1137,687278 41,03769916 3,3962E-24
Residual 4823,798373 27,72297915
Total 9374,547486
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 18,51935478 1,870097699 9,902880894 1,28624E-18 14,82835896 22,2103506 14,82835896 22,2103506
Question 62 1,467921431 0,42733722 3,435042313 0,000740767 0,624489619 2,311353243 0,624489619 2,311353243
Question 63 1,244429855 0,456754716 2,724503574 0,007097347 0,342936983 2,145922727 0,342936983 2,145922727
Question 64 1,140367814 0,444427643 2,565924582 0,011132935 0,263204779 2,017530849 0,263204779 2,017530849
Question 65 3,492715838 0,53633327 6,512211774 7,65951E-10 2,434159453 4,551272222 2,434159453 4,551272222
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Below: Output from initial regression (first iteration) analysis where 
y=Communication and x1 through x9 represents Consistency and demographics. 
 
 
Below: Output from final regression (third iteration) analysis where 
y=Communication and x’s represents Consistency and demographics. Question numbers 











df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4916,556311 546,2840346 20,70932808 2,99154E-23
Residual 4457,991175 26,37864601
Total 9374,547486
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 28,75032277 3,82819059 7,51015972 3,25306E-12 21,19309001 36,30755553 21,19309001 36,30755553
X1 -0,08598089 0,8016666 -0,107252682 0,914715739 -1,668551287 1,496589501 -1,668551287 1,496589501
X2 0,21531285 0,51202914 0,420508977 0,67464788 -0,795484104 1,226109804 -0,795484104 1,226109804
X3 -1,58806675 0,660676234 -2,403698921 0,017312026 -2,892307999 -0,283825502 -2,892307999 -0,283825502
X4 -0,2267892 0,823978175 -0,275236907 0,783470452 -1,853404889 1,39982648 -1,853404889 1,39982648
X5 -1,89817889 0,928881298 -2,043510722 0,042554417 -3,731883877 -0,064473906 -3,731883877 -0,064473906
X6 0,191290723 0,268348375 0,712844722 0,476924939 -0,338455924 0,72103737 -0,338455924 0,72103737
X7 0,434755891 0,774263483 0,56150897 0,575194465 -1,093717997 1,963229779 -1,093717997 1,963229779
X8 3,005036998 0,471292784 6,376157452 1,67004E-09 2,074657702 3,935416294 2,074657702 3,935416294
X9 3,122119466 0,474197513 6,584006415 5,54179E-10 2,186005944 4,058232988 2,186005944 4,058232988
Multiple R 0,721572649
R Square 0,520667088




df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4881,01834 1220,254585 47,25112286 7,60332E-27
Residual 4493,529146 25,82488015
Total 9374,547486
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 30,41099513 3,302927582 9,207284863 1,05225E-16 23,89203524 36,92995502 23,89203524 36,92995502
Question 82 -1,80258782 0,581095377 -3,102051559 0,002242903 -2,949490794 -0,655684849 -2,949490794 -0,655684849
Question 84 -1,83402752 0,735234054 -2,494481187 0,013546771 -3,285152677 -0,382902358 -3,285152677 -0,382902358
Question 27 3,013558546 0,462387645 6,517385528 7,45024E-10 2,100948009 3,926169083 2,100948009 3,926169083
Question 31 3,158864104 0,466355319 6,773513624 1,8619E-10 2,238422604 4,079305604 2,238422604 4,079305604
Regression Statistics
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Below: Output from initial regression (first iteration) analysis where 
y=Communication and x1 through x12 represents Involvement/Adaptability/ 




Below: Output from final regression (seventh iteration) analysis where 
y=Involvement and x’s represents Communication and demographics. Question numbers 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 6243,882876 520,323573 27,58957725 1,54729E-33
Residual 3130,66461 18,85942536
Total 9374,547486
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 10,74298893 3,789774463 2,834730413 0,005156407 3,260618296 18,22535956 3,260618296 18,22535956
X1 0,76274592 0,299103214 2,550109413 0,011673548 0,172209169 1,353282672 0,172209169 1,353282672
X2 0,659766165 0,417841284 1,5789875 0,116242579 -0,165202019 1,484734349 -0,165202019 1,484734349
X3 -0,451758084 0,532687796 -0,848072901 0,397618558 -1,50347437 0,599958201 -1,50347437 0,599958201
X4 -1,007931805 0,65625035 -1,535895265 0,126467888 -2,30360478 0,287741169 -2,30360478 0,287741169
X5 0,664937848 0,397177098 1,674159591 0,095982337 -0,119231839 1,449107534 -0,119231839 1,449107534
X6 0,997498967 0,419520642 2,377711288 0,018557953 0,16921513 1,825782804 0,16921513 1,825782804
X7 0,375115296 0,382333752 0,981120014 0,327961315 -0,379748316 1,129978908 -0,379748316 1,129978908
X8 0,549619469 0,396533348 1,386061151 0,167587287 -0,233279226 1,332518164 -0,233279226 1,332518164
X9 0,735302064 0,370712306 1,98348437 0,048962387 0,003383345 1,467220782 0,003383345 1,467220782
X10 1,771498713 0,482111053 3,67446194 0,000321314 0,819639014 2,723358413 0,819639014 2,723358413
X11 1,899692342 0,428666842 4,431628843 1,69328E-05 1,053350634 2,74603405 1,053350634 2,74603405








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5999,588395 999,9313991 50,96008455 1,10738E-35
Residual 3374,959091 19,62185518
Total 9374,547486
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 8,305526234 2,122624607 3,91285685 0,000131186 4,115779048 12,49527342 4,115779048 12,49527342
Question 6 1,001963261 0,284059208 3,527304285 0,000538382 0,441272377 1,562654144 0,441272377 1,562654144
Question 37 1,304516383 0,415628996 3,138655855 0,001997639 0,484126187 2,124906579 0,484126187 2,124906579
Question 64 0,854236922 0,375051817 2,277650401 0,023978352 0,113940079 1,594533765 0,113940079 1,594533765
Question 65 2,378520386 0,449961445 5,28605376 3,75222E-07 1,490363012 3,266677759 1,490363012 3,266677759
Question 27 2,177786216 0,416671766 5,22662295 4,95574E-07 1,355337746 3,000234686 1,355337746 3,000234686
Question 31 2,368074933 0,426143542 5,556988902 1,02856E-07 1,526930579 3,209219288 1,526930579 3,209219288
Regression Statistics
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